

Concurrent $\forall\exists$ -Hyperproperties

Ernst-Rüdiger Olderog

joint work with Bernd Finkbeiner

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Aim: analyze executions of systems

▶ **trace properties** = sets of execution traces

... express properties of individual executions,

e.g. **safety**:

$$\forall \pi. \square(\text{out}_\pi \neq \text{bad})$$

▶ **hyperproperties** = sets of sets of traces [CS10]

... express properties of sets of traces

by relating different executions,


e.g. **observational determinism**:

$$\forall \pi. \forall \pi'. \square(\text{in}_\pi \leftrightarrow \text{in}_{\pi'}) \rightarrow \square(\text{out}_\pi \leftrightarrow \text{out}_{\pi'})$$

Information-flow Security Policies

Hyperproperties refer to traces,
which represent concurrency by an **interleaving** semantics.

We model systems by **Petri nets**, which represent **concurrency** using partial orders.



This brings us to **concurrent hyperproperties**.

Concurrent Traces = Pomsets

Let Σ be a set of labels. A Σ -labeled partially ordered set is a triple $(X, <, \ell)$ where $<$ is a partial order on X and $\ell : X \rightarrow \Sigma$ is a labeling function.

A **partially ordered multiset (pomset)** over Σ is an isomorphism class of Σ -labeled partial ordered sets, denoted as $[(X, <, \ell)]$ [Pra85].

A **totally ordered multiset (tomset)** is a pomset where $<$ is a total order.

Terminology:

- ▶ traces = tomsets over Σ
- ▶ trace property = set of traces
- ▶ hyperproperty = set of sets of traces
- ▶ **concurrent traces** = pomsets over Σ
- ▶ **concurrent trace property** = set of concurrent traces
- ▶ **concurrent hyperproperty** = set of sets of concurrent traces

$\mathbb{T}(\Sigma)$ = set of all concurrent traces over Σ .

Information Flow Property

Every pair of concurrent traces agrees on the **occurrence** of the *low-security* events, independent on any other event.

Let Σ_{low} = set of *low-security* events.

The requirement is formalized as the **concurrent hyperproperty**

$$H_1 = \{ T \subseteq \mathbb{T}(\Sigma) \mid \forall [(X, <, \ell)], [(X', <', \ell')] \in T. \\ \exists \text{ bijection } f : X_{low} \rightarrow X'_{low}. \\ \forall x \in X_{low}. \ell'(f(x)) = \ell(x) \}$$

where

$$X_{low} = \{x \in X \mid \ell(x) \in \Sigma_{low}\}$$

$$X'_{low} = \{x \in X' \mid \ell'(x) \in \Sigma_{low}\}$$

The behavior observable by a *low-security* observer must not change when all *high-security* inputs are removed.

Let $\Sigma = \Sigma_{low} \cup \Sigma_{high}$.

This requirement is formalized with **quantifier alternation** :

$$H_2 = \{ T \subseteq \mathbb{T}(\Sigma) \mid \forall [(X, <, \ell)] \in T. \exists [(X', <', \ell')] \in T.$$

$$\exists \text{ bijection } f : X_{low} \rightarrow X'_{low}.$$

$$(\forall x \in X_{low}. \ell'(f(x)) = \ell(x))$$


$$\wedge \forall x, y \in X_{low}. f(x) <' f(y) \Leftrightarrow x < y)$$

$$\wedge \forall x \in X'. \ell'(x) \notin \Sigma_{high} \},$$

where X_{low} and X'_{low} are as before.

Example for Noninference

Consider low-security actions l_1 and l_2 , and high-security action h in



Low-security behavior must not change when all high-security actions are removed.

Testing of Petri Nets

Idea: testing of processes due to De Nicola and Hennessy [DH84]:
interaction of a nondet. process with a **user (test)** ,
may and **must** testing.

Here, a **test** is a Petri net, extended by a set of **successful** places.
Graphically, we mark these places by ✓ .

To perform a test \mathcal{T} on a given Petri net \mathcal{N} ,
we consider the **parallel composition** $\mathcal{N} \parallel \mathcal{T}$.


A run $\rho = (\mathcal{N}_R, f)$ of $\mathcal{N} \parallel \mathcal{T}$ is **deadlock free** if it is infinite;
it **terminates successfully** if it is finite and
all places of \mathcal{T} inside the parallel composition without causal successor
are marked with ✓ .

May and Must

A net \mathcal{N} **may pass** a test \mathcal{T} if there **exists** a maximal run of $\mathcal{N} \parallel \mathcal{T}$ which is deadlock free or terminates successfully.

A net \mathcal{N} **must pass** a test \mathcal{T} if **all** maximal runs of $\mathcal{N} \parallel \mathcal{T}$ are deadlock free or terminate successfully.

Example. Tests can distinguish runs of concurrent and interleaved systems:



The run of \mathcal{N}_{co} must pass \mathcal{T} and the runs of \mathcal{N}_{int} may pass \mathcal{T} .

Related: **causal testing** of event structures by Goltz and Wehrheim [GW96].

Checking Hyperproperties

To **check a hyperproperty** relating two concurrent traces of a system \mathcal{N}_0 , we investigate maximal runs $\rho = (\mathcal{N}, f)$ and $\rho' = (\mathcal{N}', f')$ of \mathcal{N}_0 , where \mathcal{N} and \mathcal{N}' are causal nets of \mathcal{N}_0 , but in \mathcal{N}' every action u of \mathcal{N}_0 is relabelled into a primed copy u' .


To represent the hyperproperty (with two quantifiers), **we test**

$$\mathcal{Q}\rho. \mathcal{Q}'\rho'. \mathcal{N} \parallel \mathcal{N}' \text{ } m \text{ pass } \mathcal{T},$$

where $\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{Q}' \in \{\exists, \forall\}$ and $m \in \{\text{may}, \text{must}\}$.


For H_1 consider net \mathcal{N}_C

\mathcal{N}_C :




Net \mathcal{N}_C has three maximal runs

\mathcal{N}_C :



Three maximal runs:




Corresponding traces π_1, π_2, π_3 ignore the places.

Testing Concurrent Hyperproperty H_1

Now we check the concurrent hyperproperty H_1 :


every pair of concurrent traces π and π'
agrees on **occurrence** of low-security events l_1 and l_2 .

To this end, we use the concurrent test \mathcal{T}_{con} :



Outcome of Concurrent Test \mathcal{T}_{con}

The outcome of testing ρ_1 and ρ_3 of \mathcal{N}_C :





We conclude that $\rho_1 \parallel \rho_3$ must pass \mathcal{T}_{con} . In general, we have

$$\forall \rho, \rho' . \mathcal{N} \parallel \mathcal{N}' \text{ must pass } \mathcal{T}_{con} .$$

This shows that the system \mathcal{N}_C satisfies H_1 .

Testing Noninference H_2

Consider low-security actions l_1 and l_2 , and high-security action h .



The low-security behavior must not change when all high-security actions are removed. This is tested as follows:

$$\forall \rho. \exists \rho'. \mathcal{N} \parallel \mathcal{N}' \text{ must pass } \mathcal{T}_{ni}.$$

Decidability Results

... on model checking finite Petri nets against concurrent hyperproperties:

Property class		Model checking problem
\forall	must	decidable [FO23]
\exists	may	decidable (Theorem 1)
\forall	may	undecidable [FO23]
\exists	must	undecidable (Theorem 2)
$\forall\exists/\exists\forall$	must/may	undecidable (Corollary 1)

Theorem 1. Existential may testing is **decidable**.

Proof. This testing of a finite, safe net \mathcal{N}_0 is of the form

$$(*) \quad \exists \rho_1, \dots, \exists \rho_k. \mathcal{N}_1 \parallel \dots \parallel \mathcal{N}_k \text{ may pass } \mathcal{T}.$$

We can equivalently refer to copies $\mathcal{N}_{0,1}, \dots, \mathcal{N}_{0,k}$ of \mathcal{N}_0 , and check

$$\mathcal{N} = \mathcal{N}_{0,1} \parallel \dots \parallel \mathcal{N}_{0,k} \parallel \mathcal{T},$$

for the following properties:

(1) the unfolding of \mathcal{N} is **infinite**

or (2) $\exists M \in \text{reach}(\mathcal{N}). \forall p \in PI_{\mathcal{T}} \cap M.$

$$p \in \checkmark \wedge \neg \exists t \in \longrightarrow. \text{pre}(t) \subseteq M.$$

Both properties are decidable.

Theorem 2. Existential must testing is undecidable .

Proof. We reduce the infinite Post Correspondence Problem (ω -PCP) to existential must testing.

Illustration for ω -PCP over alphabet $\{a, b\}$. As input I , consider the lists (u_1, u_2, u_3) and (v_1, v_2, v_3) , where

$$u_1 = b, u_2 = b, u_3 = aba \quad \text{and} \quad v_1 = ba, v_2 = aba, v_3 = b.$$


The ω -PCP with this input is solvable by the infinite (ω -regular) correspondence $1 \cdot (3 \cdot 2)^\omega$ because

$$\begin{aligned} u_1 u_3 u_2 u_3 u_2 \cdots &= b | aba | b | aba | b \cdots \\ v_1 v_3 v_2 v_3 v_2 \cdots &= ba | b | aba | b | aba \cdots \end{aligned}$$


The input I has no solution as a normal, finite PCP.

Simulating the Input I

Petri net \mathcal{N}_I simulating the input I of the ω -PCP:



... for checking whether two runs of \mathcal{N}_i
 simulate a correspondence of the ω -PCP:



Corollary 1.

For a single quantifier alternation we can extend the above results:

- 1 $\forall\exists$ may testing and $\exists\forall$ may testing are **undecidable**.
- 2 $\forall\exists$ must testing and $\exists\forall$ must testing are **undecidable**.

Theorem 3.

Consider $\forall\exists$ may testing of a finite net \mathcal{N}_0 of the form

$$(*) \quad \forall \rho. \exists \rho'. \mathcal{N} \parallel \mathcal{N}' \text{ may pass } \mathcal{T},$$

where \mathcal{N} and \mathcal{N}' are the nets belonging to the runs ρ and ρ' of \mathcal{N}_0 and where $\alpha(\mathcal{T}) = \alpha(\mathcal{N}) \cup \alpha(\mathcal{N}')$.


Suppose the parallel composition $\mathcal{N}' \parallel \mathcal{T}$ yields a **deterministic** net. Then it is **decidable** whether $(*)$ holds.

Example for Theorem 3

Consider \mathcal{N}_0 and test \mathcal{T}_{ni} for noninference.

Let \mathcal{N}' be the net of the run to the right of \mathcal{N}_0 .

Then $\mathcal{N}' \parallel \mathcal{T}_{ni}$ is deterministic:



Summary:

Model checking is **undecidable** for **concurrent hyperproperties** that combine existential and universal quantification.

This result is in contrast to standard (non-concurrent) hyperproperties, for example specified by HyperLTL [CFK⁺14].

For **HyperLTL** model checking remains **decidable** for arbitrary quantifier alternations, but with nonelementary complexity [FRS15].

Future work:

Generalize Theorem 3 to some **nondeterministic** testers.

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