Introduction: Discussing »Tacit Racism«

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Two years after the murder of George Floyd by a police officer in Minneapolis, and sixteen years after Oury Jalloh was abused by police in Dessau and then burned to death in police custody under circumstances that are still not clear, at a moment in time, in which the state of research with regard to systematic racist violence in the police has large gaps, especially in Germany (Hunold and Wegner 2020, KOP – Kampagne für Opfer rassistisch motivierter Polizeigewalt 2021) what can cultural and social sciences do? What is their task in the midst of intensified societal polarization, one of the salient features of which is the rise of both recurring and new forms of racism as well as the struggle and protest against many forms of group-based misanthropy? In a time of proliferation of openly displayed, shamelessly exhibited and publicly performed acts of racism in the streets, in parliaments and educational institutions, in old and new media, what methodological and analytical possibilities can the humanities and social sciences muster to make the scope of the problem visible and contribute to change? Why, in other words, do we turn towards more hidden, unconscious, or tacit practices of racism and why should that be helpful in a moment, in which the debate in Germany about the necessity of empirical social science research on systematic police violence has not yet been won (at least not at the federal level) and in which social and cultural scientists like Didier Fassin in France are commissioned by victims of police violence to conduct ethnographic counter-investigations? It is in the context of these and related questions that we invited Anne Rawls and Waverly Duck to contribute an essay to this debate section and introduce the argument of their book *Tacit Racism*, published just a few months before we started to prepare this issue. *Tacit Racism is Institutionalized in Interaction in the US: What about Elsewhere?* invites readers and fellow commentators to explore how racism is co-produced in interaction. It therefore advances an argument that tries to complement existing research in, for example, Critical Race Theory by asking »how the inequalities that have been documented […] in the large scale economic and social relations […] and the differences revealed by research on intersectionality, translate into interactional practices« (in this volume, p. 214). The authors thus direct our attention to aspects of our daily lives where we might least expect to find racism at work – in the very micro-practices by which we co-produce our social worlds. Those are situated practices, and they are likely to differ between societies. The authors challenge us to think about how racism is encoded in the everyday social expectations in societies other than the U.S. with its particular history of racism, labour exploitation and inequalities.

In recent years, diverse forms of racism, antisemitism and other forms of systematic discrimination and neo-colonial orderings have taken centre stage in public debates in Europe. In Germany, pioneering work of authors such as Annita Kalpaka and Nora Räthzel (1986), Mark Terkessidis (1998, 2004, 2019), Erol Yildiz

(1999, 2014), Pipo Bui (2004), Paul Mecheril (2007), Serdal Güler (2009), Ilka Eickhoff (2010) and Annita Kalpaka, Nora Räthzel and Klaus Weber (2017) have helped paving the way for a new generation of public intellectuals raising their voices on racism (Amjahid 2017, 2021; Hasters 2019, 2020; Kelly 2021) and demanding a public debate on long standing forms of discrimination. Scholars like Arndt (2005), El-Tayeb (2001, 2016), Foroutan (2019), El Mafaalani (2021) have helped to establish the crucial importance of these topics for social and cultural theory, as much as for a functioning democratic society.

In hindsight, it can only be called a major scandal in the history of European and North American *Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften* (humanities and social sciences) that, for too long, majority thinkers have treated the suppression of minority scholarship and racism as side issues (for an analysis of the situation in American Anthropology see Allen and Jobson 2016). They have thus contributed to »trivialize the centrality of the problem… and allowed it to fester«, as Waverly Duck and Anne Rawls argue in their contribution (see p. 211 in this volume). They remind us that the marginalization of voices that have tried to do otherwise has contributed to upholding the illusion that racism is not a problem within the workings of democratic, Western societies and, by extension, within their universities (in this volume, p. 211). The need to address racism and to decolonize academia applies to all disciplines, and even though the topic has gained some ground in recent years, the difficulty scholars continue to face when trying to build a career on this topic bears witness to this history of continuous neglect and rejection. Moreover, a short survey of the diversity of students' and university teachers' bodies, for example in German universities, makes it poignantly clear that the trivialization of the topic has had far reaching consequences for universities and the societies they are meant to serve. Students, who are continuously exposed to racism at the university, have started to form associations and organize

workshops to counter racism. Whoever attends one of these self-help forums (often instigated by AStAs at universities and independent student organizations) cannot but fall silent in view of the painful reports of BPOC-students recounting their experiences with teachers, administrators and fellow students. The pain, tears and fears, that the very institution that is meant to produce and protect a community of learning, inflicts on the young people who strive for knowledge and education are not only shameful, but testify to systematic and endemic forms of exclusion. It is one of the unsettling arguments of Duck's and Rawls' article that such forms of exclusion are normalized or even naturalized, when they are either primarily rendered as problems of individual mind-sets (and thus located at the level of individuals), or somehow ascribed to the workings of structures and institutions (and thus at least partly out of reach).

In their paper, Waverly Duck and Anne Rawls propose to revisit forms of everyday racism, not at the margins of societies but in their midst – directing their empirically detailed attention to routines, tacit expectations and systemic, and often unconscious, patterns of racist interaction. It is a privilege of White people and a structural feature of racialized societies that such patterns are often little commented upon in diverse publics and equally little reflected upon in the everyday lives of many Whites (Cakaya and Mepschen 2019). Waverly Duck and Anne Rawls explore how systemic racism is »institutionalized in taken-for-granted practices of interaction«, in what they call »interaction orders of race« . Both have been working together on this for many years. Their perspective is primarily sociological, more specifically: ethnomethodological. One of the crucial features of ethnomethodological research is to foreground practice to all other elements in a given situation or social setting. In many ways this is counter-intuitive, since most social and anthropological theories continue to invoke structures and institutions to explain social orders (and thus, for example, how a regime of White

supremacy is enacted) or actions and actors with their intentions and identities to explain practices (and thus, for example, racist discrimination). Following Garfinkel, the authors turn this taken-for-granted model of the social world on its head and zoom in on the modes in which structures, actions and intentions are co-constituted in interaction. For this purpose they lead us into the ethnomethodological world of micro-studies and sequential analyses.

Inspired by W.E.B. Du Bois' concept of »double consciousness« (which, as Meyer remarks, must also be understood as »double membership«) and Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology Rawls and Duck carve out what they call »grammars of interaction« (see the responses by Jean Beaman and Christian Meyer). These racist grammars of interaction are empirically investigated in three diagnostically rich situations of interaction, partly under laboratory conditions and partly on the basis of filmed visual sources which are later analyzed: situations of ›first contact‹ in everyday life, of systematic devaluation of *Black* people in professional roles, and a hard-to-bear scene of an interaction between *White* police officers and a *Black* civilian. (We need to issue a trigger warning at this point: The description of this interaction does not entail physical violence but may nevertheless have retraumatizing effects in some circumstances.)

There is, of course, a thoroughly extensive body of research, for example on the phenomenology of racism (reports and auto-ethnographies from the perspectives and experiences of those repeatedly affected by racism in everyday life) as well as on everyday racism (Essed 1990) as a systematic and structural problem anchored in the centre of social reproduction, representational strategies, and forms of interaction. Notably institutionalized forms of everyday racism have been widely researched (see only as examples Fassin 2016 and 2021; Heinemann and Mecheril 2017; Hunold and Wegner 2020, Jäger 1992, Terkessidis 2004, Wacquant 1997). Schools, labour markets, educational systems, housing and the media have been studied in terms of how they not only absorb and transmit racist and racializing discourses, but also in terms of how they independently produce discrimination and disadvantage. In the case of our own working environment, i.e. German universities, empirical educational research has shown that the system of higher education in Germany has particularly exclusive effects – referring to a variety of discriminations and disadvantages, for example on the basis of class/stratum, immigration, language or religious affiliation.

So what is missing or should be renewed with regard to the current state of research? It is evident that even after years of cultural and social studies research, pressing questions and research findings about everyday racism remain outside the canon of our disciplines and are still underrepresented. Equally, they are still underrepresented in the centre of cultural and social theory. Waverly Duck and Anne Rawls themselves argue that much of the research on everyday racisms is still caught up in the old dichotomy of individual versus structure. To put it more succinctly: Much research on everyday racism in their perspective has either examined opinions, attitudes, prejudices, and psychological mindsets on the side of the individual or structures – discourses, laws, constitutions, markets, sciences, and institutions – understood as external factors of influence that often seem out of reach for everyday actors.

In contrast, with their interactionist and ethnomethodological research program focusing on empirical details in micro-situations and their theoretical concept of interactional expectations, Anne Rawls and Waverly Duck have developed interesting tools to overcome this dichotomy. Most commentators confirm and reinforce this argument and see the bringing together of fine-grained qualitative empirical data with a program of analysis that focuses on »racialization in action« (Meyer, in this volume, p. 244) as a particularly innovative and relevant step in their contribution.

Our own impetus for why we curated this debate can be summarized in three points.

First, we wanted to re-examine what Duck and Rawls refer to as »tacit« more explicitly as situated in the current polarized and politicized debates about racism and anti-racism. »Tacit« is translated in German either as *stillschweigend* (which refers to the Latin verb *tacere*, *schweigen*, *to keep silent*, as the word root of the term Anne Rawls and Waverly Duck use both in the title the essay published here and in their book) or as *implizit*. We wanted to discuss how implicitly racist expectations embedded in everyday interactions change in the context of an explicit debate about racism. Is this really still about »unconscious« racism, an ›interaction order of Race‹ only subliminally known by Whites? Or can Michael Polanyi's reflections on »tacit knowledge« help us to interpret the orders of racist expectations and embodied everyday knowledge as more active appropriations and more controversial, if implicit, decisions. Polanyi sees tacit knowledge, like every form of knowledge, as including an »appraisal«, a »personal coefficient, which shapes all factual knowledge« (Polanyi 1962:17). One of the strengths of Polanyi's thinking on »tacit knowledge« certainly lies in his rejection of dualistic distinctions between theoretical and practical, objectified and subjective, and between tacit and explicit knowledge. For him, all knowledge practices are »skillful actions« (Polanyi and Prosch 1975: 44). Following Polanyi, we were interested in discussing the proximal notion of »tacit« in the context of racially patterned expectations and to see what can be learned about »tacit« racism as an active blocking of knowledge, as a racist attitude appropriated in the context of socially distributed and widely available alternatives (see Ann Stoler's plea for shifting the discourse about »amnesia« in the context of ›unremembered‹ or ›forgotten‹ colonialism to »aphasia«, a distinctly more salient and complex language disorder to analyse (Stoler 2011; see Beaman in this issue).

Second, we thought it productive to ask how Waverly Duck's and Anne Rawls' research with its focus on the United States would be received and discussed in European contexts and what modifications, extensions, or alternative research designs it might prompt. This question is taken up by our commentators in a variety of ways and it is interesting to read how they address national or supranational differences in the everyday orders of tacit racism. Given the diverse transnational or global interconnections of lifestyles, social movements, political forms, and discourses of all kinds, forms of comparison operating under the assumption that their units of comparison are disconnected and discrete increasingly turn obsolete. Any attempt for comparison or clearly cut juxtapositions seems to be at loss in the face of traveling concepts and entangled lifestyles, the globalization of social movements and the proliferation of international social media and political networks. Movements such as Black Lives Matter translated into different social and national settings and the concepts and forms of political resistance traveling with them have empowered minorities to articulate their anger and their demands. However, how racist interaction orders are globally intertwined and intermingled is usually little addressed (but see Beaman in this issue). This perhaps indicates a research desideratum of its own. The entanglements of orders have long been evident in everyday life; however, empirical studies on such entanglements are, to our knowledge, largely lacking.

Third, and perhaps most crucially, we wanted to explore the scope or extent to which updated ethnomethodological approaches and a practice-theoretical orientation towards everyday forms of »racialization in action« (Meyer, in this volume) might be well equipped to anchor everyday racisms more firmly at the centre of social consciousness. Casting ›Race‹ not as a pre-empirically existing category, but instead making the processes of its production visible in situ

and in process (see Balkenhol and Schramm 2019), as ›Race‹ in practice or interaction, contains a hope. Being identified as practice theorists ourselves, we tend to see value in the description of racist everyday (inter)actions as emergent and in permanent need of doing / undoing. The leeway in »doing racism« (Balkenhol and Schramm 2019) might include active disregard of existing anti-racist or at least less racist alternatives (Meyer, in this volume).

Not all of the esteemed colleagues we invited to this debate shared the concerns that are raised by Rawls and Duck, and some of their scepticism was mirrored by the anger we encountered when we discussed their text in different settings. After all, practice theory is not a theory of action. The »interactional expectations« examined in the text go beyond individual intention. They are so deeply ingrained into social lives and the ways how social worlds are reproduced in ordinary interactions that they are difficult to avoid. Those who belong to the *White* majority may not even recognize racism when it manifests. This kind of tacit racism that readers encounter in the text, is outrageous, it hurts.

But the detailed analyses of racialized interactions in everyday life might also promote an awareness of possibilities for change, or even more: the need for change. In other words: there is potential for enlightenment. Rawls' and Duck's descriptions of micro-interactions, which, of course, are made from a specific positionality indicating different, often antagonistic social positions, intend to amplify societies' potential for making inconspicuous racisms conscious and known, alongside the explicit racist violence that is so visible. If it is true that, with a radicalized theory of practice, the capacity for social reflection is expanded, then there is also hope for change. With their plea for a ›White double consciousness‹ the two authors turn their analysis into a manifesto. Making visible what is hidden enables you to put yourself into the place of the other. What is needed, therefore, is more research

on these mundane interaction orders that constitute everyday life, within and without the universities.

The multi-voiced and lively dialogue that has emerged in the debate that follows is inspiring and provides numerous indications of how the research approach of Anne Rawls and Waverly Duck (which they explicitly reflect as specifically US-American) invites further thinking, indeed: more than we could have hoped for. So, for example, when Jean Beaman points to the analytical potential for theorizing global racisms, which, starting from Du Bois, is already inherent in the observations and indications of Duck and Rawls, but should be explored more systematically and comprehensively in the future. When Martijn de Koning takes up the ball and discusses tacit racism on the basis of his own empirical research on racialization and anti-Muslim racism in the Netherlands (in this volume, p. 234). When Giolo Fele locates the sly and persistent forms of tacit racism (more clearly than Rawls and Duck can address it here themselves) in the context of a specific theory of modernity less based on shared expectations than on conflicting negotiations. When Christian Meyer, in turn, continues to spin this thread and points to the importance of empirical investigations that address precisely not the noiseless consummation, but the ruptures and breaches of racist expectation orders in everyday live. Such research will be able to make visible and delineate alternatives more thoroughly and explore the production of racializing and racist orders of interaction as compromised and/or opportunistic acts of choice. Last but not least, Levent Tezcan, from a German perspective, argues for paying attention to the multiplicity and dynamics of figuration processes in (post)migration societies. In doing so, he is concerned with a recognition of both the malleability and the multiformity of »systemic and tacit« racist interaction. We would like to thank our admired commentators very much for their excellent contributions, all of which open up future research strategies.

The transnational Black Lives Matter Movement (Williams 2015) marks and combats structural racism and institutional discrimination as forms of everyday racisms. Current everyday, ›tacit‹ racism in its many forms has not only been handed down, but is also publicly reinvented and partly re-normalized. The social and cultural sciences are undoubtedly called upon to publicly counter these developments. In our opinion, this implies an extension of scientific responsibility from texts, ideas, knowledge and research programs to include universities as the institutions we work in as well as the social and political contexts in which we are embedded. We hope that the debate on tacit racism initiated by Waverly Duck and Anne Rawls will have some power to support this.

Tacit Racism is Institutionalized in Interaction in the US: What about Elsewhere?[1]

Anne Warfield Rawls and Waverly Duck

We were asked to write a summary of our book *Tacit Racism* (Rawls/Duck 2020) to stimulate discussion of our research approach in Europe. In doing so we confront several challenges. First, a summary leaves out details, which is problematic because our argument rests on detailed analysis of social interaction. Summarizing the relationship between our argument and prior theory and research on Race, including the Black American and minority scholarship from which it takes inspiration, is also complicated.[2] Our research is unique. But there are important relationships and we address these below (see also Rawls/Whitehead/Duck 2020). That Europe and the US have different histories of Race and colonization, and that the discussion in Europe is in a ›post-colonial‹ phase, is another challenge. There is no corresponding ›colonial‹ phase of relations between Races in the US. The whole country began as a former colony.[3] Black Americans were not colonized by White Americans, nor were they ever ›immigrants‹ in the European sense. The language and literature of post-colonialism do not fit.[4] Furthermore, the idea of Race is itself problematic. As we discuss it, Race is an American invention, a social construction as W.E.B. Du Bois argued, with no basis in biology. Du Bois also argued that while Race is the most significant category dividing the

1   Die deutsche Übersetzung ist unter https://doi.org/10.25819/ubsi/10116 frei zugänglich.
     The German translation is openly accessible at https://doi.org/10.25819/ubsi/10116.
2   We capitalize Race and other exclusionary category terms as a possibly irritating reminder that Race is a social fact and not a biological fact in all our publications. Although the social fact status of Race has been acknowledged since Du Bois introduced the idea – there are still too many who consider Race a natural distinction. From there it is easy talk about how natural it is for people to be afraid of differences. What differences? Our answer is that the differences that scare people – the ones that ›count‹ – are socially constructed differences, not natural differences.

3   In our book we do discuss the possibility that White Americans are suffering from a colonial mentality that dates from the 1600's. But it is quite evident that Black Americans are not.
4   However, recent immigrants to the US from former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere, have brought the post-colonial mentality to the US, creating problems in the Black American community that we discuss in our book.

US population, it is also the primary unifier within the Black community. The experience of racism that Du Bois called »double consciousness« gives Black Americans insight into racism and democracy that White Americans lack. While aspects of that insight may have been exported along with the concept of Race, it has no European counterpart.

Tacit Racism is a book about how systemic racism in the US has become institutionalized in the taken-for-granted practices of everyday interaction – in what we call ›interaction orders of Race‹ – such that ordinary people are constantly doing racist things without being aware of it. Most discussions of Race and racism have focused either on individual prejudice or on formally institutionalized racism in legal and other formal organizations. This centers the discussion on ›racists‹ rather than ›racism‹ and on formal processes rather than interaction (e.g., the currently popular terms ›micro-aggression‹ and ›implicit bias‹ both focus on individual behavior). We hope to change this narrative by refocusing the discussion on the systemic racism embedded in social interaction. Our research is unique in treating interactional expectations as ›structures of racism‹ that are ›institutionalized‹ at the level of social interaction. Acting on these structures produces racist outcomes – *in what people do* – regardless of individual intent or awareness.

We expect that something similar is happening in Europe, as immigrants seeking to join new societies confront the cultural biases coded into the interactional expectations and social categories of the countries they now live in, and we invite researchers from around the world to join us in documenting this problem. However, we caution that the conceptions of Race and the tacit structures of interaction involved will not be the same across countries (or even regions).

In our book, we consider these issues in the context of a Black/White binary racial category system that developed in the early North American colonies in the late 1600s and persists today as an American tradition. We do not use the term tradition to refer to differences between societies, but rather to refer to differences within the US that are shaped by the 400-year domination of Black Americans by White Americans, and the resulting privileges that some 60% of White voters in the 2020 presidential election still claimed as their right. These traditions date from slavery, and the racial domination they encode still grounds US economy and society.

Suppression of minority scholarship is also an American tradition. The marginalization of pioneering research on Race and slavery contributed by Black and Jewish scholars, and the trend toward individualism and positivism in research and theory aligned with White ideals that silenced their voices, contribute to the invisibility of racism (Rawls/Duck 2019). Racism and a Race-based system of labor control and oppression sit at the foundation of US society. Treating Race as a side issue, of relevance only to minorities, has trivialized the centrality of the problem, hidden it from view, and allowed it to fester. In the US, those who cling to tradition and resist change are clinging to racist domination and White supremacy whether they realize it or not.

Misunderstandings of what Race is are also problematic. Race is a social category with no biological basis, a point made originally by Du Bois (1940). Until recently, his position was ignored, and Race treated as a natural scientific category. Societies generate the social categories members use to organize themselves and their experiences. As such, Race varies against the history and social organization of any given society or country. How Race categories developed to force Africans to labor as slaves for the benefit of their English owners in the early colonies (which we discuss below) shaped not only the development of conceptions of Race, but how tacit racism is embedded

in the interactional expectations of Black and White Americans today.[5]

Our studies of how tacit racism has become institutionalized in interaction orders are situated within this exclusively American background. While most approaches to racism treat it either as a psychological effect of prejudice and hate, or as an aspect of formal structures, we argue that focusing on individuals and formal structures has had the effect of hiding dimensions of racism that are socially institutionalized in interaction, thus helping to perpetuate it.[6]

The solution we offer is to expose the interactional practices of systemic racism, as they are institutionalized in the daily practices of Americans, while calling attention to the Black and minority scholars whose insights we build on (including key Jewish scholars), and the innovative research practices they developed (ethnomethodology and conversation analysis EM/CA). We hope to produce awareness among majority thinkers of how racism shapes literally everything. Du Bois called the Black American awareness of racism »double consciousness«. In homage to him we call the awareness we hope our research will produce »White double consciousness«.

Our approach involves the claim that some phenomena popularly referred to as ›micro‹ and considered a matter of individual attitudes (›micro-aggressions‹ and/or ›implicit bias‹) actually involve structures of interactional expectation that are constitutive of self, social objects and meaning. There are no social selves/identities without society. The popular psychologizing of social action, and the treatment of actors and social objects/meanings as existing independent from interaction – has been an obstacle to getting this point across. The interaction that creates these objects happens *between* people – through seeable, hearable sounds and motions that occur in time and space that cannot be reduced to ideas and intentions. As social structures, interaction orders do not vary with the beliefs and attitudes of individuals, but rather involve structures of shared interactional expectation used by individuals to *make* meaning, self and social objects.

In using the term ›structures‹, we do not mean either ›macro‹ or ›micro‹ structures. We refer to the structure of interaction orders; sets of expectations that are constitutive of the objects and meanings they produce; something like the rules of a game. The argument parallels Chomsky and Wittgenstein who proposed grammars of syntax and »language games« respectively. Our approach expands the idea to grammars of action or culture (an idea first proposed by Garfinkel and Sacks; see Garfinkel [1967]2020 and Rawls 2019a, Rawls/Turowetz 2019).

Garfinkel (1963) proposed a set of reciprocity conditions – »trust conditions« – as a requirement for »orienting« these rules cooperatively. Working with Garfinkel, Sacks proposed that the rules for a speech exchange system could be identified empirically (Sacks 1962). We recognize Garfinkel and Sacks as pioneers with insights into the processes of exclusion that originated in their own experiences as Jewish minorities (Garfinkel [1947]2012; 1956). For Garfinkel these experiences took place in the American ›deep south‹ (North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, Texas, Mississippi) in the 1930's and 1940's where he was not considered White (Rawls/Whitehead/Duck 2020; Rawls forthcoming a).

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5   When ›scientific‹ racism emerged in England and at the beginning of the Twentieth century it elaborated on earlier conceptions of Race that had originated in the US colonies.

6   Getting people focused away from individual ›good intentions‹ toward how society is structured is necessary. If the overall structure is fundamentally racist and exclusionary, then good intentions, no matter how good they make us feel about ourselves, will perpetuate systemic racism (as in Mannheim's ([1929]1936) example of how a person who gives money to a beggar is actually supporting the economic system that makes beggars out of people in the first place).

The ›trust conditions‹– constitutive conditions of reciprocity in interaction – which Garfinkel (1963) proposed, are roughly that participants must use the same definition of the situation, orient the same expectations or rules, extend benefit of the doubt to others, assume other participants are competent until they show they are not, confirm competent presentational work by others, and assume that others are doing the same and assuming the same of them. All of this occurs at an unconscious level of taken-for-granted, and thus largely hidden, practices.

Given these conditions, participants can orient shared rules in an infinite number of ways and innovate endlessly. But, for actions to be mutually understood they must be recognizable as ›moves‹ that orient the constitutive expectations of a particular game, or social/cultural practice. As Garfinkel ([1967]2020) argued, taking the other persons' pieces off the board in chess, or putting your mark outside the lines in tic-tac-toe, is not »playing the game« and people cannot play it with you if you do it. The same is true for the interaction orders of everyday life.

The interactional expectations we identify with tacit racism are institutionalized structures in this sense. They are expectations – constitutive grammars of interaction – that belong to a situation of social action such that they are ›constitutive‹ of *the recognizability of an action as action* of a particular sort (greetings, introductions, confirmations, instructions, etc.), for people who share those expectations. When actions do not meet the constitutive expectations of others, those others cannot recognize what has been done, or said. They will typically be troubled by this, and assign motive/blame to the individual who has done the unexpected thing. We find that this happens often between Races in the US because systemic inequality has led to the development of clashing interaction order expectations for Black and White Americans (Rawls/Duck 2020; Duck 2015; Duck 2016).

Failures at the level of interaction order are consequential not only because they result in loss of meaning, but because in violating ›trust conditions‹ they impact judgments of the competence of participants, their motivation and their trustworthiness, reducing the general willingness of people to try interacting again. Discovering and analyzing troubles at this level of interaction order requires detailed ethnographic observation supported by audio/video data, an interactional approach to self and identity, and an approach to meaning that does not focus on concepts, or comprehensive symbolic systems, but rather on how social categories are created and used *in-situ*, and on the ›order properties‹ of the ›sequences‹ of social action that people tacitly orient in making sense together.[7]

In what follows we offer some historical and theoretical background for our approach and then discuss three of our findings in the context of the historical oppression of Black labor in the US and the insights of Black and minority scholars about those conditions. First, we find that there are Race differences in interaction order expectations about what should be said and done when Americans first meet one another, in what we call »introductory sequences«; Second, we find that high status Black Americans experience frequent failures by others to recognize their legitimate identities, which we call »fractured reflections« of their presentations of self; and, third, we document a Black American practice we call »submissive civility«, a conception inspired by Du Bois' argument that the Black American value of submission to the good of the whole is a valuable democratic practice that could offset the undemocratic

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7 »Order properties« is being used in both a literal and a technical sense here. Sequences have order properties such that whether something said or done comes first or send, for instance, has implications for what it means (Sacks/Schegloff /Jefferson 1974).

›White strong man ‹ ideal.[8] We analyze this practice through a Black/White Police/Citizen encounter that was video-recorded. Overall, we argue that Black Americans are not only the democratic heart of the US, but that they are consistently punished by the majority for their democratic behavior.

Background for our Conception of Interaction Orders of Race

Our conception of ›interaction orders of Race‹ builds on groundbreaking early work on Race and inequality by Harold Garfinkel (1940; [1942]1949; [1942]2012), in combination with Erving Goffman's conception of interaction orders (joined later by Harvey Sacks' examination of how Race categories are used in conversation). The research is also informed by W.E.B. Du Bois' (1903) foundational writings on Race, and Eric Williams' (1944) pioneering analysis of slavery and capitalism. Our theoretical formulation began in the 1970's (in consultation with Garfinkel) and continued through the 1980's with an initial focus on narratives about slavery (Rawls 1983; 1987; 1989; 1990). After 1987 the empirical research on Race differences in social interaction began. The intent has been to make interactional aspects of Race and inequality that ordinarily remain hidden and taken-for-granted visible. This has been done through an EM/CA inspired analysis of interaction and its expectations as revealed by troubles in interaction

and narratives about those troubles. This approach – *to make the hidden visible* by focusing on problems and accounts – is the essence of Garfinkel's studies of ethno-methods in social interaction, which we treat as a method for producing a kind of ›double consciousness‹ about social practices.

While Du Bois is not generally thought of as a social interactionist, we argue that his work provides a starting point for analyzing racism in interaction, and for conceptualizing the Black American worldview and social expectations that developed in opposition to that racism (Rawls 2000). Our approach also acknowledges the contributions of approaches to Race and ›implicit bias‹ developed in Critical Race Theory (Bell 1973; Crenshaw/Gotanda/Peller/Thomas 1995, Delgado/Stefancic 1995), and the groundbreaking conception of ›intersectionality‹ developed in Black Feminist Thought (Crenshaw 1989; Spillers 1987; Hill-Collins 1990). However, our research focus is different and has independent origins. Whereas Critical Race Theory and Black Feminist Thought focus on experiential and structural implications of Race, gender and inequality, we explore how those inequalities have become institutionalized in the interactional structures of everyday social interaction – in typically unnoticed ways – such that interaction orders vary by Race identity and positioning in American society.

This dimension of racism in interaction has been largely overlooked by other approaches. The question we ask is how the inequalities that have been documented by Critical Race Theorists in the large-scale economic and social relations that characterize the separate worlds of Black and White Americans, and the differences in awareness of the relationship between individual selves and the larger community revealed by research on intersectionality, translate into interactional practices – into clashing ›interaction orders of Race‹. In doing so, we reprise a largely neglected interactional side of Du Bois' argument and connect it to Garfinkel's research.

8 ›Submissive civility‹ can be difficult for White people to understand. From a White perspective it has negative connotations of both ›femininity‹ and ›submission‹. But, why should anyone think it is inferior to be feminine? Or, why should anyone think that considering the good of the whole before one's own self-interest is either weak or negative? Black Americans do not think that being democratic and treating people as equals makes a man feminine. White men aggressively refusing to save American lives in the name of their own personal freedom during the COVID-19 pandemic gave us all an important illustration of this point.

While Du Bois (1903: 134) did not address the issue of interactional differences in detail, he did include communicative issues in his consideration of ›double consciousness‹, arguing that there are four levels of »race contact«: the first level is physical proximity, the second concerns economic relations, and the third, political relations. The fourth level, which he calls »less tangible«, involves interaction and conversation. Indeed, his own first experience of racial inequality is described in the context of a schoolroom interaction. It is this fourth level which we take up. According to Du Bois, this interactional level of Race contact consists of:

»[t]he interchange of ideas through conversation and conference, through periodicals and libraries, and, above all, the gradual formation for each community of that curious tertium quid which we call public opinion. Closely allied with this come the various forms of social contact in everyday life« (Du Bois 1903: 135).

Du Bois' treatment of interaction as an essential form of Race contact includes the role that daily interactional practices play in the formation of individual self-consciousness, in the achievement of mutual intelligibility, the creation of narratives, rumors, stereotypes, and finally, in the interplay between those institutional structures that result from, and then place constraints on, differences in communicative practices. Du Bois says:

»It is, in fine, the atmosphere of the land, the thought and feeling, the thousand and one little actions which go to make up life. In any community or nation it is these little things which are most elusive to the grasp and yet most essential to any clear conception of the group life taken as a whole« (Du Bois 1903: 147).

While interaction is essential, its »elusive« workings, he says, are *curiously invisible*. This, for Du Bois, »is peculiarly true of the South«. Describing interactions in the south during the first Jim Crow period, Du Bois (1903: 148) emphasizes the subtlety of the forces at work, which are so unobtrusive, he says, that »the casual observer visiting the South sees at first little of this«. People are quite literally living in different socially constructed worlds. Du Bois (1903: 148) says that the visitor: »realizes at last that silently, resistlessly, the world about flows by him in two great streams; they ripple on in the same sunshine, they approach and mingle their waters in seeming carelessness, then they divide and flow wide apart«. Between these two worlds, according to Du Bois, there are almost no points of intimate or intellectual contact:

»Now if one notices carefully one will see that between these two worlds, despite much physical contact and daily intermingling, there is almost no community of intellectual life or point of transference where the thoughts and feelings of one race can come into direct contact and sympathy with thoughts and feelings of the other« (Du Bois 1903: 149).

The lack of close contact that began during reconstruction is different from the close daily contact that occurred between Races in the south before the Civil War, and Du Bois dates the separation between Races to the Reconstruction period. C. Van Woodward (1955), in his famous book *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, insists that racial segregation was an invention of the Jim Crow period, and not part of »southern tradition« as those who have resisted civil rights for Black Americans claim. Jim Crow, and its modern iteration in mass incarceration (Alexander 2011) and the *Chokehold* (Butler 2017), have effectively created and sustained two separate worlds, blocking Black Americans from participation in the White world, while requiring the pretense that their submission to Jim Crow is voluntary, and that they are full participants.

In his first publication, Garfinkel (1940) made the hidden, taken-for-granted character of this complicity the central feature of his approach, pointing

out how the tacit social structures of Jim Crow broke down when two Black bus riders made them explicit by refusing to participate in their own humiliation. Making racism explicit undermines the polite surface veneer behind which it hides, which is one reason why the prospect of Black equality is such a fearful thing to those still wedded to traditional Jim Cow assumptions and practices.

The problem, as Du Bois eloquently develops it, includes the idea that not being able to achieve mutual reciprocity and equality with a group of others, particularly through close daily contact, is damaging to the development of both self and mutual understanding. »In a world where it means so much to take a man by the hand and sit beside him, to look frankly into his eyes and feel his heart beating with red blood; in a world where a social cigar or a cup of tea together means more than legislative halls and magazine articles and speeches, one can imagine the consequences of the almost utter absence of such social amenities between estranged races, whose separation extends even to parks and street-cars« (Du Bois 1903: 150). While Black and White Americans may occupy the same physical space, we rarely occupy the same interactional space. Because interactional expectations developed separately for 160 years, displays of social behavior by members of one Race can look deviant to members of the other. Interaction orders demand compliance with expected use, which is constitutive of the social production of self, social objects and meaning (Goffman 1959; 1961; 1963; Rawls 1987; 1989). Actions within a practice can constitute recognizable social identities and objects that cannot exist without it: But only when they orient expectations in recognizable ways. Because the expectations of the two interaction orders are not the same, White and Black Americans often violate each other's expectations and the resulting judgments of incompetence have a moral tone.

Black Americans experience an added difficulty: as selves who must interact in two conflicting interaction orders, they are held to two conflicting sets of demands. In order to recognizably construct practices in one interaction order, they often must violate the expectations of the other. These conflicting interactional requirements confront the African American self in American society on a daily basis. A degree of social/moral tension greater than the challenge of having one's role or identity differentially shaped and valued from situation to situation is involved. White Americans tend to be unaware of this. In spite of their lack of awareness, however, White academics have been confident in dismissing the insights of Black scholars.

The Invention of Race in the US

The argument, as we make it, is grounded in a Race-based labor system designed by an English colonial empire in the 1600s that shaped the US economy, politics, law and social structure, and persisted across 400 years to become institutionalized in contemporary interaction. Race was invented to support the system of colonial labor in the American colonies when it confronted a sudden scarcity of unfree English/Irish labor (due to the start of industrialization in England around 1660), just as unfree African labor became plentiful (after the treaty of Westminster gave England access to the African slave trade in 1654). This, according to Theodore Allen (1994; 1997), gave birth to the modern idea of Race and explains why English colonies in North America developed a Black/White Race binary while Spanish and Portuguese colonies did not. It has little to do with the colonizing culture and everything to do with labor control issues.

Before this, Race categories were not used in the colonies, or anywhere else in the world. Previous references were to color, physical description, religion, nationality and culture. So, in an important sense *the birth of the modern conception of Race occurred in the US because early plantation owners needed their*

newly freed English/Irish laborers to begin suppressing their former African workmates, with whom they had previously been allied. The new category ›White‹ was used to encourage that suppression, a development that became so popular that White Americans are now, according to Jonathan Metzl (2019), *Dying of Whiteness*.[9]

Social categories, and expectations about their use, constrain possible identities and situate people in a status quo. New uses of categories can create a new status quo, or challenge an old one. That the US American Black/White binary developed to serve the purpose of suppressing Black laborers is a moral loading that is inherent in the categories. A person who says they are »proud to be White« invokes that moral loading whether they intend to or not. ›Whiteness‹ has meaning only against that binary. Being »proud to be Black« has very different moral loading.[10]

In considering how and why this Race category system has persisted over four centuries and through the development of science, industry, and an allegedly ›free‹ labor system (that continues to suppress Black workers), we invoke Durkheim's ([1893]1933) distinction between consensus-based social forms that are organized on the basis of traditional beliefs and categories (that resist change), and dynamic practice-based social forms that can self-regulate without consensus in contexts of diversity and specialization.

This is not a distinction between the US and other societies. Rather, we distinguish between places/situations within the US that cling to traditions based on slavery and Jim Crow segregation, and others, where people have begun to embrace new forms of self-regulating practice-based science, technology and occupations. The latter have multiplied in cities and on the coasts, where populations are more diverse, and specialized occupations have concentrated. In places where resistance to racial equality is strongest, the diverse populations and specialized occupations that generate self-regulating practices have not developed to the same degree, leaving those places dependent on consensus.[11]

This leaves the US divided between two forms of society with conflicting moral and organizational requirements. Often referred to as a »culture war« we treat it as a conflict between two ways of even having a culture/society (Rawls 2021). Traditional consensus-based societies and businesses not only tolerate inequality, they can thrive on hierarchies within and boundaries between themselves and others. However, in diverse specialized societies and occupations/sciences, where self-regulating practices predominate and experts are essential, the reciprocity requirements of practices – the ›trust conditions‹ – require equality/justice within the practice (Rawls 2019b). While people may adopt a *belief* in justice, unless they do the hard work of rooting out injustice, residual consensus will remain embedded in new

9 Metzl (2019) documents how the mythology of Whiteness encourages White Americans to support the interests of the rich in ways that lower their own quality of life and health; increases the proliferation of guns and gun violence (including high rates of suicide among White men), defund schools in an effort to hurt minority students, cut taxes for the rich in ways that strip infrastructure budgets, cut social services and vote against affordable health care.

10 In every country there will be ordinary words that have such moral loadings that need to be explored.

11 It is a sad fact today that tax surpluses from Blue states need to be given to Red states to make up their budget deficits, while the voters in Red states complain that their tax dollars are supporting Black Americans in big cities, and vote to cut their taxes even more. Red states are not supporting Blue states. Red states continue cutting their own social services because they believe this. It is a vicious cycle supported by false beliefs. If Blue states refused to support them most Red states would immediately go bankrupt.

self-regulating orders of practice – such that a belief in justice exists alongside tacit forms of injustice that contradict the social requirements of those practices and keep them from working for all people. This is why a failure to root out the racist foundations of US social structure have been so devastating.

Some places/situations openly embrace a tradition of racism. Others reject that tradition in principle, but because it is so deeply embedded, have not yet been able to reject it in practice. Consequently, while parts of the US that still rely on traditional consensus are more overtly racist, in more diverse and educated communities lingering injustices have become tacit, and tacit racism has become the predominate form perpetuating racism in those places.

Durkheim's classic ([1893]1933) explanation of this clash between traditional consensus and self-regulation is one of the minority insights that have been lost because majority scholars insisted on misinterpreting him as a consensus theorist when he argued against the need for consensus in modernity. One reason White scholars might have missed the point of Durkheim's critique, is that in ordinary times they live in a world where most things accord with their beliefs and challenges their majority views are rare. It feels like consensus. By contrast, minority scholars and women confront constant challenges to the validity of even their own personal experiences, giving them an awareness that there is no consensus holding things together.

All societies have some consensus and some self-regulation. The difference is in the proportion. As societies develop a significant proportion of self-regulating practices, they often still retain enough residual consensus to prevent equality and justice from actualizing – even when people fervently *believe* in justice. This is problematic because self-regulation in diverse modern contexts requires more cooperation and flexibility than consensus permits. Without an explicit program of moral education, Durkheim

(1925) feared that traditional injustices would remain entrenched and societies would take problematic abnormal forms.

The US currently finds itself such an ›abnormal form‹. We live in a type of society that requires justice in its scientific and technical practices and between members of a diverse population – but we are without actual justice – and we have not adopted a system of moral/civic education that could solve the problem. In fact, we have been retreating toward a consensus-based educational system that strengthens tradition and weakens self-regulation.

Once a society has diversified and become dependent on science and technology a strong traditional consensus is a problem. Forms of interaction that require equality cannot succeed between unequal categories of people. The illusion of fairness can be maintained for majority people (who can often manage to talk only to people in their category), while at the same time inequality prevents successful interaction across Race. Given this illusion, talk about racism rarely occurs in day-to-day interaction and when it does is problematic, which leads White people to avoid it (DiAngelo 2018). Thus, the majority have the illusion of justice, when the whole system is built on racism.

The excluded tend to be alone in being aware of this. When their voices are eliminated, as they have been, the illusion that there is no problem can be maintained. The theory and methods that support this illusion of fairness are hegemonic, and minority voices that criticize that hegemony (Du Bois; Durkheim; Williams; Garfinkel; Goffman; Sacks), have been marginalized by a combination of misinterpretation and outright suppression of their work. In challenging this hegemony, and arguing that an interactional approach that treats order as constitutive of meaning is necessary to document systemic racism, we build on Du Bois' insight that after reconstruction (after 1876) US society developed two separate streams that flow side-by-side with little contact, and that only

the excluded, who develop »double consciousness«, are aware of this.

It is our position that in a diverse society riddled with systemic racism, and given an academic context that has excluded minority voices and suppressed studies of interaction, huge amounts of tacit racism can be present without majority people being aware of it. Consequently, when Black Americans describe their experiences with racism, most White Americans have not recognized what they are talking about and dismiss their claims. The extraordinary summer of 2020 witnessed a change as White Americans began waking up to the Trump administrations' overtly racist policies/actions (although only 4 in 10 rejected this racism at the polls). But unless we get a better grip on tacit aspects of the problem quickly – interest in it will fade once the more overt aspects of racism become less public – they are no longer so obvious to the majority.

Race Differences in Expectations about ›Introductory Sequences‹

When people meet each other for the first time they have basic expectations about what information should be shared and how it will be shared. Names are usually exchanged first, and colleagues at the same company might identify the part of the company they work in. But it turns out that beyond those basics, in the US the expectations vary so much by Race that ›introductory sequences‹ between Races are typically fraught with misunderstanding. In the early 1990s, narratives about »nosy White people« relayed by Black colleagues and students, alerted us to problems at the very beginning of interracial interactions in ›introductory sequences‹. White Americans were routinely asking for information that Black Americans considered private. This was concerning, as it would likely prevent friendships from developing even between Black and White people who wanted to form them. White people we talked to at the time had no idea

what this narrative meant, while almost every Black person we asked recognized the narrative, laughed and then told us a story about their experiences with »nosy White people«.[12]

Garfinkel (2002) called this method of giving a story to get a story a »coathanger«: the story becomes a coathanger for the person you interview to hang their own matching story on. The selection of what story matches the one told by the researcher is done by the interviewee, which is a good exploratory method when a researcher is not a member of a practice. Once we understood more about the narratives, we realized they were evidence of a pervasive phenomenon that should be examined in detail. The challenge was that ›introductory sequences‹ between the same two people only happen once. We needed to be present at such meetings to collect data.

Also, because interaction order expectations are largely tacit, only coming to consciousness when they fail, we realized that the narratives we had collected were likely generated by *failures*, representing the imputing blame and motive phase of post interaction troubles. This left open the question of what success would look like if two Black speakers did not violate one another's expectations? Or, two White speakers?

We did manage to observe a few such introductions ethnographically. But they don't happen often and go by quickly. We decided to make them happen in a setting we controlled and asked for student volunteers. The challenge was to create a context in which ›introductory sequences‹ would occur as naturally as possible so that we could record them on video and analyze how they were organized across an actual interaction. We asked for student volunteers, got their permission to be interviewed on video-tape, and sat them together in a room and then left them to introduce themselves while they waited for us to

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12 Waverly Duck, an undergraduate at the time, joined the team in 1996 and has been part of the work ever since.

return. We matched some students in same Race pairs and others in mixed Race pairs. However, we invited only female students, making all pairs female/female, to prevent gender differences from complicating the interactions.

The set-up was designed to allow for the introductory talk Black and White speakers prefer to occur without prompting.[13] We recorded many such sequences. While each is different in details, we were able to identify preferred characteristics of what we call the Black introductory type and the White introductory type that are constitutive of mutual understanding for those familiar with the expectations, while producing problems for those who are not. We also held dozens of large interracial focus groups, workshops and community meetings about these recordings during which we discussed our analysis and collected feedback.[14]

In the original paper (Rawls 2000) and in our book we reproduce transcripts of ›introductory sequences‹ accompanied by an in-depth turn-by-turn analysis of what the order properties involved reveal about Black and White interaction order preferences. We identify a typical White/White introductory sequence that proceeds by asking questions about category information like where a person lives, works, goes to school, their marital status, whether they have children etc. White Americans prefer to *ask and be asked* for this information, and do not generally volunteer information not asked for. Black speakers, by contrast, prefer not to be asked such status and category questions, and prefer to *volunteer* the information they do give. To say that these are preferences means that the occurrence or

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13 The videos of ›introductory sequences‹ were made for a 1994 project in which student volunteers participated (discussed in more detail in Rawls 2000; Rawls/Duck 2020).

14 The analysis went on for six years. The recordings were played in class, for focus groups and alumni groups and at public forums.

non-occurrence of asking for category information in the respective interaction orders is meaningful, and that assessments of moral character and mutual commitment are based on whether and how these expectations are fulfilled.

The big point here is that the implications of the same conversational ›move‹ are different in a Black introductory sequence than they are in a White introductory sequence. White speakers *should* ask category questions. If they *don't* it means something and is ›accountable‹ (they are held accountable for the lack). Black speakers *should not* ask. If they *do* it means something and is ›accountable‹. When White Americans talk to Black Americans, who do not answer and ask such questions, it can trigger narratives like »Black people are rude« and »they were holding back, I don't think they liked me«. White Americans are apt to feel that they tried their best to be friendly and were rejected. Sometimes they conclude that Black people did not like them because they are White – triggering the narrative that Black people are racist.

For Black Americans such category information is personal. It also quickly reveals social status – which Black Americans avoid – instead focusing on topics drawn from the immediate setting. We find that this does not vary by social class as many scholars expect. If anything, high status Black Americans are more scrupulous about reserving such information about themselves.

This clash explains the Black narrative »White people are nosy«. The Black American introductory sequence prefers to proceed on the basis of topics available in the local setting, while avoiding category identifiers that reveal social status and inequality. The emphasis is on what can be seen, heard, smelled, etc., in the immediate surroundings: on ›personhood‹ instead of social status identifiers. *The Black preference is the mirror opposite of the White preference.*

Avoiding categories leads to intimacy among African Americans, whereas it is treated as a way of

avoiding intimacy by White Americans. Maynard and Zimmerman (1984: 304f.), for instance, found that talk focused on the immediate setting seemed to function as a technique for avoiding intimacy and maintaining anonymity in conversations between White college students. By contrast, African Americans in our data report that talk focused on immediate surroundings is respectful of them as persons, and thus preferred. Furthermore, the quest for category identifiers by White participants is treated by Black Americans as devaluing their personhood.

Expectations about this are not the same in Europe, where the White American practice is often considered pushy and rude.

The differences can be both confusing and upsetting. Whereas the preferred White sequence has several clearly identifiable elements that usually come up (residence, job, education, marriage, children), there are no such identifiable elements of a preferred Black American introductory sequence because of its focus on the immediate setting. Avoiding the use of stereotypical identities and categories, participants are expected to talk about things in the setting, such as: »You in the class?« »What's this interview about?« »How you doing?« This preference preserves equality and dignity against the inequalities encountered by Black Americans daily in White American society.

In not relying on category identification as the foundation for building new relationships, Black Americans are engaging in a purer form of reciprocity that promotes equality by relying more exclusively on the self-organizing mutual exhibition of preferences and reciprocities face-to-face and move-by-move, and less on category information. Whereas the African American preference avoids information that would locate persons in a social hierarchy – where most Black Americans are at a disadvantage because of systemic racism – White ›introductory sequences‹ focus on category information that places people into status and role categories. As Goffman (1959)

maintained, the meaning of words and actions depends on the *definition of the situation* and the *role* or *identity* a speaker has within that definition. *This gives status and stereotypes relevance* in ways that bring racial inequalities into interaction from the start. White speakers focus on getting information to settle such identity issues – without being aware of its relationship to systemic racism – while Black speakers work to minimize the relevance of stereotypes and unequally distributed identities: in the process neutralizing inequalities.

»Fractured Reflections« of High Status Black American Presentations of Self

400 years of systemic racism have created a White racial framing of American life (Feagin 2014). Living within this frame Americans – Black and White – learn not to expect to see Black men and women in high status locations and identities. It should be obvious that this racialized way of ›seeing‹ Black people would impact on their ability to perform high status identities. But the general belief seems to be that success can neutralize racism for high status Black Americans.

Our first observation of Fracturing occurred in 2003 when the authors witnessed a puzzling interaction in which a Black man who was confronted with a failure to recognize his competent performance of his high status identity refused to acknowledge that failure. After much discussion and the collection of additional instances, we realized that we had witnessed something important. As with our other findings, it took extensive discussion and observation to achieve an understanding of this phenomenon from both a White and a Black perspective.

Black men and women are constantly confronted by failures to recognize their high status identities (not only by White people). However, they often do not either recognize or repair these failures. Nor do they respond the way the literature on the internalization of negative self-image would predict (Fanon 1952).

Instead, they often refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of those who denied them recognition. They were also talking to each other about these occurrences.

We found that this interaction order preference for refusing to acknowledge such failures, combined with systemic racialized expectations about status and identity was producing what we call »fractured reflections« of self-presentation, a type of interactional event we argue is frequently experienced by Black Americans (Rawls/Duck 2017). Approaches that assume a colonial, post-colonial model of Race expect a loss of self-esteem and/or attempts to repair presentation of self that were not occurring. Approaches that treat self and identity as given prior to interaction also miss the significance of this interactional event.

As with the ›introductory sequences‹ discussed in the prior section, our data collection focused on narratives about the Fracturing event. Like the experiences Du Bois drew on for his conception of ›double consciousness‹, ›fractured reflections‹ are a well-known ›experience‹ that high status Black men and women tell each other stories about. But they remain unknown to the White Americans who produce them by failing to recognize legitimate Black identities.

To get more detailed descriptions of the existence and contours of the phenomenon we recorded in-depth interviews with 38 high status Black men who were top executives, collecting and transcribing their narratives about Fracturing. We focused on Black men for two reasons: First, Black men are the targets of the most extreme stereotypes about violence and crime, which we had good reason to believe followed them into high status positions; Second, one of the authors is a Black man who had better access to men to discuss this sensitive topic. As with our earlier study of ›introductory sequences‹, which focused only on women, we decided to avoid confusing gender with Race by focusing only on men. All 38 of the high status Black men we interviewed recognized our narrative

about a Fractured Reflection and told us stories about their own experiences with it. Our original paper (Rawls/Duck 2017) reproduced transcripts of these narratives, and our analysis establishes that Fracturing occurs frequently, provides a description of how it occurs, and, takes up implications. Here we offer only a short description.

During any interaction, people are expected to present an identity they have a right to and that is appropriate to the situation they are in (Goffman 1959). A Black corporate Vice-President we call Robert giving his administrative assistant a task is an exercise of appropriate identity. There is an essential moment in the process when a presentation of identity/self has been made and it is the turn of Other(s) present to recognize, respond to, and ratify that presentation. The integrity, legitimacy, the very existence of the self *as presented*, depends on (and can be changed by) that response. In Robert's narrative, he describes how, when he asks his assistant to do something, she goes behind his back to ask other people (including the company President) if she should do what he says. This is a Fracturing event that Robert refuses to acknowledge to her – but it leads him not to trust, even though he believes that she wants him to succeed. He calls her actions »insubordinate«, interpreting her ›checking‹ as evidence that she does not think he is competent.

Fracturing occurs when the person presenting self, in this case Robert, is given back a reflection of their identity performance that is not recognizable to them (indicating that the Other did not recognize the appropriateness of their identity, or their competence in presenting it), and this happens not only once, but so often that over time they learn not to treat it as accurate feedback that they are doing something wrong.

Typically, we expect a presentation of self that is not confirmed to be repaired by the presenter. For Black Americans, however, there are so many situa-

tions in which, what Joe Feagin (2014) calls a »White racial frame«, prevents Others from recognizing their competent high status identities, that they learn to ignore the problem. Failures to recognize and ratify competent presentations of self, reported frequently by the high status Black men interviewed, threaten to strip them of the social identities they are entitled to, and the dignity, power, and authority associated with those identities. Not only is this an injustice in the conventional sense, it violates the »trust conditions« (Garfinkel 1963), and equality (Durkheim [1893]1933) necessary to make self and social objects together in societies where self-regulating practices predominate.

The ›Non-Recognition‹ of identity experienced by Black Americans (and White women in high status positions) threatens the process of sense and self-making, and led the Black men we studied to take the evasive action we call a »Null-Response«.[15] Because these men can retreat into their own Black interaction order to confirm their sense of self they are not destroyed by Non-Recognition. But it makes their jobs more difficult and they are constantly faced with inappropriate responses that test their creativity and ingenuity. While the high status Black Americans who have this experience are well aware of it, when it occurs, the White Americans who initiate the Fracturing typically do not understand why their Black friend or boss is doing a Null-Response, or how upsetting it is.

When Black Americans say they experience racism on the job *every day* this is one of the things they mean. There is no place in White American society where a Black American, however accomplished, can count on having their competence and qualifications recognized.

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15 This lack of response is also familiar to the White female author as a preservation technique. But it is doubtful if many White women manage to use it with any consistency.

»Submissive Civility«: An Orientation of Black Masculinity to Oppression and Inequality

Du Bois (1890) argued that being submissive to the good of the whole is an important strength highly valued by Black Americans that is not valued enough by White Americans. He referred to the Black ideal in terms of a ›submissive man‹ who is submissive to the good of the whole, contrasting it with what he called the ›White strong man‹ ideal. Du Bois' offered Jefferson Davis, president of the confederacy during the Civil War, as an example of a ›strong man‹. Davis, who sacrificed the country to serve his own interest in continuing slavery was not orienting the good of the whole. Today Donald Trump represents the same willingness to sacrifice others. In the context of the 2020 presidential election, we offer Joe Biden as an example of a ›submissive man‹ who puts the good of the whole before his own interest. The ›strong man‹ ideal does not represent strength, but wanton self-interest. Similarly, in being submissive to the good of the whole the ›submissive man‹ is strong. The labels do not carry literal meaning.

A just social contract requires citizens to give up some things for the good of the whole. As Hobbes ([1651]1909) initially argued, it is the exchange of the full freedom of animals – to eat and be eaten – for the benefits of living in a society. Debates since Hobbes have mainly been over what a fair social contract would look like, not over the need for one. The question is why so many people revere the ›strong man‹ who takes whatever he can from the whole, while feeling that there is something less admirable in ›submission‹ to the good of the whole.

Given the existence of two such conflicting ideals, we expected that there would be empirical evidence of this in interaction that would be observable as clashes in interactional preferences. It also seemed likely that ›submissive civility‹ would lead to trouble in inter-racial interactions, when the actions of

Black men (in particular) in being ›submissive‹ were misunderstood by White Americans.

While writing up our research on ›fractured reflections‹ around 2015 we observed several interactional responses to racist violence and threat by Black men and women that exhibited a cooperative posture we thought could best be described in Du Bois' terms. After collecting ethnographic observations, we realized there might be recorded instances in archival video of Black/White police/citizen encounters that would facilitate a detailed sequential analysis.

In our original article (Rawls/Duck/Turowetz 2018) we introduced the interactional practice we call »submissive civility«, in the context of video data from a Black/White police-citizen encounter. We reproduced a partial transcript of a 16-minute video accompanied by a turn-by-turn CA analysis of the sequential structure of the interaction. The transcript is long and the analysis extensive. Here we summarize only one part of that analysis. The Black male citizen caught up in the encounter, in trying to establish his identity as a resident of the house and city neighborhood where the police approach him, adopts a submissive and cooperative posture. We argue that this is a preferred resource for Black Americans in situations where they are confronted by racialized domination and threat.[16] Because it clashes with the individualistic White American ideal, however, this preference for ›submissive civility‹, which relies on heightened-cooperation and formal respect, is often misunderstood by White Americans, *who tend to interpret social action as if White interactional preferences were the only legitimate expectations*. The two police officers wonder aloud why this Black man is being so cooperative and suggest that he is trying to hide something. That he is trying to show them everything

so that they will not suspect him does not occur to them: It is not a practice they recognize.

While ›submissive civility‹ is a Black American preference with strong democratic virtues, the police in our data do not recognize either its preferred status, or its legitimacy. Instead, they treat this Black citizen's cooperation as grounds for suspicion and a pretext for arrest, enforcing White interaction order preferences as if they were legal requirements.

In a democratic society, *access* to situated identities – like ›neighborhood resident‹ – should be equally available by Race. Because of racial oppression and exclusion, however, African Americans are not expected to hold legitimate identities in many situations. When identity problems do occur, interaction order differences in how Black and White Americans try to resolve these problems can create additional misunderstandings.

›Submissive civility‹, is being smart, polite, and civil, going above and beyond what is required to avoid trouble.[17] For Black men, particularly in talking to White police officers, this can be challenging. We find several identity issues at work in the encounter that have particular relevance to how the event unfolds. The Black citizen resident (CR) could not get the officers to recognize him as a person who belongs at his mother's house: a common problem for Black men that is a Fractured Reflection of their identity. Instead, the officers orient a criminal/illegitimate identity from the beginning; a racial stereotype CR refuses to accept. There is a second identity issue working at a deeper level of reciprocity failure. The officers do not see the ›ordinary reasonableness‹ of CR's actions. If he does live here, and is waiting for his mom, his actions are *all* reasonable, and due to the public nature of the case *we know they were*. But the

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16 Gabbidon (2007) has argued that Du Bois also laid the foundations for a sociological approach to criminology.

17 Fassin (2013: 93) found that Arab/Black youth adopt a similar submissive posture when confronted by the French police.

two White officers (PO2 and PO1) keep saying that the situation and his behavior are strange.

From the White male officer's (PO2) initial attempt at ›humor‹ (line 33), which makes fun of CR for trying to break into his mother's house, we see that from the officer's perspective this ›Black guy‹, was acting in a way he did not consider ›normal‹ from the beginning. But he can't arrest him without a reason: a pretext. Resisting is a preferred pretext (Bittner 1967; 1973; Chevigny 1969). However, CR will be ›submissively‹ civil, but he will not laugh at a joke that demeans his identity, and it is unreasonable to expect him to do so. While the opening ›joke‹ may (or may not) have been intended as an ›icebreaker‹, it positions CR as a deviant, and PO2 told the ›joke‹ and laughed at it (by himself) four times over the course of the incident. Regardless of the officer's initial intent, this is a serious failure of reciprocity (Jefferson 1979), indicating that PO2 is not engaged in mutuality with CR: He is being disrespectful, and not responsive to how CR feels about it.

Already, in the first seconds of the interaction the parties can be seen orienting two different definitions of the situation, a misalignment that continues. PO2 projects a ›humorous‹ conversational course that CR refuses to follow, instead interpreting the situation as serious. If PO2 had wanted to produce a problem in the interaction (so that he can accuse CR of resisting, which he later does), he has been effective. If he was hoping to communicate, then he has undercut his own purpose.

At line 33 PO2 indicates that it seems funny that he has accused a man of breaking into his mother's house and, that when the police get there, he is still sitting on the porch. As PO2 says several times over the course of the interaction, it is a very unlikely scenario. Nevertheless, he will continue to say this and laugh about it four separate times as he questions CR in front of his house. CR's responses display that the situation does not seem funny to him. It is in fact happening

to him. He told the first officer who he was and she indicated that she was satisfied. But, after the two officers conferred at the police car, PO2 approached for the first time and opened with the ›joke‹ that CR treats as an accusation. CR's responses indicate that he treats the encounter as having immediately become much more serious.

#2: Greensboro Part Two: PO2 Body Cam time Code: 01:34

33 PO2:   What are you doing breaking into your mom's house?

34   (0.6)

35 CR: I'm not breaking in here.

36   (0.2)

37 O2:   Uh(h) heh huh heh

38   (1.4)

39 PO2:   What's with the shovel?

40   (0.6)

41 CR: The shovel was here before.=I just picked it up off the yard when I got here sir.

42   (0.6)

43 PO2:   Yeah they said you tried to open the garage door with it.

44   (0.5)

45 CR: No I didn't.=I want- all- this is what I did.=This is what I did.

46   (3.7) ((CR walks over to garage door and demonstrates))

47 CR: This is what I did.

48   (1.1)

49 CR: I got to make sure the dog wasn't in the- uh: garage. That's all I tried to do.

50   (1.4.)

51 CR: That's all I tried to do.

52   (0.7)

53 PO2:   Alright.

54   (0.4)

After a pause in which CR does not respond to his laughter (line 38), PO2 asks another question hearable

as an accusation, »What's with the shovel?« (line 39), and CR treats it as such. In asking for an account for the shovel, PO2 implies that CR's possession of it is problematic and requires justification. The female officer had introduced the shovel in the context of her description of the citizen call to the police. But, PO2 asks a direct question: »What's with the shovel?« (line 39). As Bolden and Robinson (2011: 96) observe, questions that solicit accounts and/or justifications embody »a type of suspension of ›trust conditions‹ (Garfinkel 1963) by claiming that [the speaker] cannot make ›typical‹ sense of the causes of, or motives for, the event«.

CR responds with an account of what he did with the shovel (line 41). PO2 follows this with a more explicit accusation – the third from CR's perspective: »Yeah they said you tried to open the garage door with it« (line 43). But, this time PO2 does so indirectly, reporting the speech of an absent third party, likely another reference to the citizen caller: »they said«. In response, CR makes an explicit denial, »No I didn't« (line 45), followed by *a physical reenactment* of »what I did« (line 46), during which he gets off the porch, walks to the garage, and then returns to the porch. The reenactment is accompanied by an account: »I got to make sure« (line 49), that refers to his concern about whether his dog is locked in the garage. CR's turn-final »That's all I tried to do« (line 49), which he repeats (line 51), is an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz 1986): *All* places a maximal boundary around his actions, and the intent behind them, as does his subsequent turn, »[t]hat's it. Nothin' more nothing less« (line 55).

We refer to this reenactment as a sequence of ›submissive civility‹ in the face of a series of what CR treats as accusations – all following an initial misalignment occasioned by PO2's ›joke‹. The reenactment is elaborate: going above and beyond what he is asked to avoid trouble.

In a democratic society, ›submissive civility‹ *should* be preferred. By contrast, the ›strong man‹ ideal aligns with the racist/sexist/classist ideology that those who can't ›pull themselves up by their own bootstraps‹, don't deserve voting rights, health care, food, shelter, or education; that those who are different weaken society; that government should let the strong do what they choose to the weak; and that White people ›have made the most important contributions‹ to the country and its culture. This undemocratic ideology equates contributions to society with the ›strong man‹; freedom with the unrestricted right to dominate others; and considers the weak and poor unimportant except insofar as they can be forced to make profits for the rich (Mayer 2016). It is important also to point out that in the US the so-called strong men at the top, who are said to have made it on their own, have always had others to pull their ›bootstraps‹ up for them: first through literal slave labor and now through forms of labor that pay so little that people can be forced to work under any conditions.

Du Bois offered submission to democratic principles as a counter-narrative to this hyper-individualistic ›American Dream‹, ›bootstraps‹, ›free market‹ ideology: positioning Black Americans as the democratic heart of the nation. They still are. For democracy to work, each individual must commit to the principle that equality and democracy are more important than any individual's self-interest: The modern civic person must be submissive before the principle of civil democratic publics, and the interests of the ›strong man‹ must bow before the general interest – or there is no democracy. In this regard, Du Bois proposed that *the Black American grasp of democracy is stronger than the White American grasp*, precisely because the Black American *experience of racial oppression*, and the development of a »double consciousness« about that oppression, creates a commitment to equality and democracy among Black Americans. We argue that ›submissive civility‹ exemplifies that commitment.

How will the Situation in Europe and Elsewhere Be Different?

One of the warnings to take from the US experience is that Race and exclusion can be efficiently exploited to support an anti-democratic agenda in ways that can seem reasonable on the surface. Every social group has some apparently reasonable complaints: They have been left out of the economy; they don't want their ›freedoms‹ impinged on; they don't want their taxes to support people they don't approve of; they don't want their way of life to change. Finding the systemic racism hidden behind these complaints requires a broad consideration of how the ›way of life‹ being defended and the freedoms being claimed not only originate in inequality, and in case of the US in slavery and segregation, but continue to be maintained by racial inequality: That ›our‹ traditions in the US have always meant White traditions that actively exclude minorities; that the people ›we don't approve of‹ are Black and Brown; that the reasons we don't approve of them involve false stereotypes that rationalize slavery and the suppression of Black civil rights; that White freedoms have never been available to Black Americans; that the wealth and privilege of White workers still comes at the expense of the mass incarceration and under-employment of Black and Brown workers, which is why they need social support; and, finally that the reason White people feel threatened by the prospect of racial equality is that it not only requires giving up those unfair and unearned traditions and privileges, but will also require finally acknowledging that the whole thing has been built on racism all along.

What had been invisible until recently is how false fronts backed by *Dark Money* (Mayer 2016) that funded the rise of a radical Right in the US had organized to exploit those ›reasonable‹ complaints. It turns out that powerful actors have infiltrated universities with false ›science‹ designed to convince White people that their real complaints were not about the poor jobs and bad pay they actually have, but about Black people and foreigners who they are told have taken their jobs. These false fronts push false stereotypes to hide the very real inequalities among White Americans that have been increasing year-by-year through legislation supported by the same dark money that has stripped American citizens of rights, social programs, education and jobs. The apparent reasonableness of these complaints has also been supported by ways of speaking publicly about racism through ›dog-whistles‹ (coded language) that can only be heard by those who are aware of the hidden racist positions (Anderson 2016; 2018; Haney-Lopez 2013).

Each country, or political/economic area, should expect to find that it has developed similar problems of its own – even if they are just beginning. But, in each country the process will work differently – and what it takes to make it visible and reveal those who are manipulating things behind the scenes – will be different in each case. It will require a focus on the details of interaction that can make what has been taken-for-granted visible.

In areas still organized by traditional consensus, Race and exclusion should be more obvious and overt than in diverse places where traditional consensus has begun to be replaced by self-regulating practices. This does not mean that there is less systemic racism in places with more diversity, however. In the latter, overt racism will likely have gone underground and become embedded in ordinary interactional practices as tacit racism. Because these diverse places have an even greater need for equality and reciprocity to support self-regulating practices – it is precisely here that racism can do the most damage.

Every colonial empire was structured differently in how it used racism and exclusion to support labor relations, and every country or area will have its own unique hidden dynamics. Sometimes the response to oppression by minorities will have taken the form of a »colonial mentality«, as described by Franz Fanon

(1952), in which the excluded emulate their colonizers and collude in their own suppression. This response was sometimes characteristic of the public responses of Black Americans in the Jim Crow South in the US before WWII (although according to Du Bois it never accurately conveyed their private response). In other cases, the response may have led to the development of alternate forms of identity and social solidarity – like the ones we found in Black and White interaction orders in the US – because assimilation was not either possible or desirable.

All of these issues will be filtered through a ›color‹ lens that sometimes operates more like the US binary, while in other cases – like Brazil, which has at least 23 ›color‹ distinctions – many categories developed. But, everywhere, social and identity expectations are assigned by color to some extent, although in varying ways. In Latinx culture the phrase »there is no Latinx without Black« has become a new way of acknowledging that all people who identify as Latinx have some African/native heritage that in the US binary is categorized as Black – even though many Latinx here identify as White.

Black communities in the US have openly and broadly embraced an awareness of Blackness as a positive status since at least the 1950s – and have typically rejected calls to assimilate since that time, insisting that there is something wrong with the majority culture that they do not want to emulate. Our findings document how these criticisms of majority expectations as dishonest, fake, individualistic, and disrespectful of personhood, manifest in the preferences of the Black American interaction order, which orient equality and democracy.

One of the advantages of the US binary, according to Du Bois, is ironically, that because it did not allow Black Americans to assimilate, it forced the best and brightest people with African ancestry to remain in the Black community to shape its ideals and fight for its freedom. It is not surprising that under these conditions the ideals of the Black American interaction order and its interactional preferences are more vibrant and democratic than the status-oriented preferences of the White interaction order and its ›White strong man‹ ideal.

The way social theory and research methods developed in each country, and how they have either supported the status quo and silenced minority voices or, promoted awareness, will also be different. Critical theory, which was developed in Germany in the 1930s by Jewish intellectuals on the basis of their experience of exclusion has been one important source of awareness. Du Bois, Garfinkel, Eric Williams, and more recently Critical Race Theory and Black Feminist Thought, have played a similar role in the US. But, in most countries such movements did not occur, and apart from some European universities in the 1960s and early 1970s Critical Theory did not become dominant anywhere The international thrust has rather been driven by developments in US sociology during WWII toward a type of statistical quantitative methodology that naively treats secondary data sets as facts in a way that supports majority White thinking (Rawls 2018).

No matter what the history of a country or area has been, every new disaster, natural or man-made, that produces refugees and/or asylum seekers will generate its own exclusionary dynamics and stigmatized categories of people. Some will create entirely new categories of Race and exclusion, but most will play out against an embedded historical background, and many of the dynamics should be similar. All will provide fodder for elites who strive to benefit from exploitation – and the processes will often become tacit and hidden.

Our work is intended to suggest a pathway for uncovering what has been hidden.

Responses

On Tacit Racism in France

Jean Beaman

In 1955's »Equal in Paris«, an essay in *Notes on a Native Son*, writer James Baldwin wrote of his experiences as an African-American living in Paris and the racism he witnessed and experienced:

»It was quite clear to me that the Frenchmen in whose hands I found myself were no better or worse than their American counterparts. Certainly their uniforms frightened me quite as much, and their impersonality, and the threat, always very keenly felt by the poor, of violence, was as present in that Commissariat as it had ever been for me in any police station. And I had seen, for example, what Paris policemen could do to Arab peanut vendors. The only difference here was that I did not understand these people, did not know what techniques their cruelty took, did not know enough about their personalities to see danger coming, to ward it off, did not know on what ground to meet it. That evening in the Commissariat I was not a despised Black man. They would simply have laughed at me if I had behaved like one. For them, I was an American. And here it was they who had the advantage, for that word, *Américain*, gave them some idea, far from inaccurate, of what to expect from me« (Baldwin 1955: 106, emphasis in the original).

I thought of Baldwin's rich retelling of his encounter with Parisian policemen after being suspected of stealing a hotel bedsheet when reading both Rawls and Duck's essay, *Tacit Racism is Institutionalized in Interaction in the US: What about Elsewhere?*, and their recently published book, *Tacit Racism* (Rawls/Duck 2020). In this particular incident, Baldwin reflects upon both the racism facing France's racial and ethnic minorities, as well as the relative privileges associated with being an American in Paris. Here, Baldwin is not treated as a »despised Black man«, and therefore, to borrow Rawls and Duck's analysis, did not fit within particular expectations for interracial interactions in French society. His identity as simultaneously Black, yet American, violated particular rules of interaction in Paris.

In their essay, Rawls and Duck rightfully note how »racism shapes literally everything« (2020: 3). This is also true in the context of Europe, despite how many societies actively disavow the existence of Race and racism and relatedly relegate such issues outside of Europe.[18] Therefore part of how racism manifests itself is through the continual silencing of Race and racism as salient. It is particularly provocative to consider tacit racism and the related rules and structures of interaction in France, as it has long disavowed Race and racism as real and consequential. In what follows, I relate Rawls and Duck's illuminating analysis of the institutionalization of tacit racism to the French context. Specifically, I discuss the relevance of Du Boisian »double consciousness« for minorities in France; the role of colonialism in shaping France's racial grammar; and the state of academic and public discourse on racism in France and comparisons between France and the United States. While conceptions of Race and its tacit structures of interaction are contextual, it is also fruitful to consider how they compare and contrast across differently organized societies.

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18 Here, I reference David Theo Goldberg's (2006) framework of racial Europeanization, in which Race is seen as a problem everywhere but in Europe.

W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) wrote of the »global color line«, or the relation of the darker to the lighter Races around the world. Therefore, his theorizing of Race and Blackness necessarily had a global component. His conception of ›double consciousness‹ relates to how Black Americans have a second-sight into racism and broader norms and rules of society that White Americans do not. Such a conception of minority consciousness, or the state of being a racialized minority in a society, is also relevant in France. In my own ethnographic research with adult children of Maghrébin, or North African, immigrants (Beaman 2017), I found that Maghrébin-origin individuals similarly had to be both conversant in French codes or ways of being and Maghrébin codes or ways of being, and in doing so, had insights on racism and post-colonialism in France that their White French counterparts lacked. As these individuals became upwardly-mobile compared to their migrant and working-class parents, they found themselves as part of only a handful of Maghrébin or non-Whites in their elite universities, such as Sciences Po, or professional workplaces. Rawls and Duck write that, »[t]here is no place in White American society where a Black American, however accomplished, can count on having their competence and qualifications recognized« (2020: 23). This is also the case for middle-class racial and ethnic minorities in France (and not just Maghrébin-origin individuals). My interlocutors also reported their actions and behaviors doubly scrutinized and their deservingness continually questioned in the workplace relative to their White counterparts.

Moreover, these children of Maghrébin immigrants have to continually imagine their locations within French society through the lens of how their White counterparts view them. Because the French state routinely disavows categories based on Race and ethnicity, these individuals are continually regarded as not French, or as foreigners or immigrants, because they are non-White. My interlocutors would report

how other French people would ask them, »where are you *really* from?«, when they would initially respond to questions of origin with their town or region in France where they grew up. Relatedly, they often experienced being called ethnic slurs or being told to go back to their country by White counterparts as children. To relate to Rawls and Duck, this suggests that there exist rules to interracial interaction in French society, and a commonly agreed upon racial grammar which reinforces a racial order in this seemingly non-racial and anti-racial society.

Rawls and Duck situate the racial interaction order in the US as dating from slavery and its related construction of racial categories. While the French context is different historically, a consideration of France's colonial rule (including its own history of colonial slavery) and subsequent migration to the metropole in the postcolonial period reveals the roots of France's racial grammar. France's colonization of the Maghreb, West Africa, Vietnam, and parts of South America and the Caribbean (including Guadeloupe and Martinique which are presently overseas *départements* of France), was part of its civilizing mission to spread its ›values‹ around the world. While French Republican ideology does not recognize identity-based categories, including Race and religion (Chapman/Frader 2004), France's colonial empire relied on a differential construction of populations seen as ethnically different (Kastoryano/Escafré-Dublet 2012). In this way, racial and ethnic distinctions are made in the absence of official state categories. Such distinctions did not end when French colonial rule ended. As individuals from these former colonies migrated to the metropole (France actually has a long history of immigration, but World War I and the end of colonial rule saw an increase in the numbers of migrants), settled and raised children, France was continually forced to confront its ugly colonial history, as Maghrébin and Black individuals were often visible reminders of France's colonial empire that it would prefer to ignore in the

postcolonial period. This relates to what anthropologist Ann Stoler (2011) terms France's »colonial aphasia«, as an alternative to the terms »forgotten history« or »colonial amnesia« in that it emphasizes the occlusion of knowledge. This erasure of the colonial leads to a »panic« of the postcolonial. And interracial or interethnic interactions exemplify this »panic«, as France struggles to promote its narrative of national cohesiveness in multicultural society. Reckoning with Europe's history of colonial and imperial rule moves us beyond solely an immigrant-focused lens to grappling with how actual citizens are marginalized in France – and across Europe – because of their Race and ethnic origin. So ›interaction orders of Race‹ are not new in France, but rather have been established during France's colonial rule.

Moreover, contemporary patterns of policing in France, particularly towards Black and Maghrebin-origin individuals, reveal ongoing colonial logics in the postcolonial period. As Rawls and Duck use »submissive civility« to explain the expected behavior of Black men in the face of White police officers, this ›submissive civility‹ is also applicable in the French context, as police officers perform identity checks, or *les contrôles d'identités,* disproportionately targeting Black and Maghrebin-origin individuals (Fassin 2013; Jobard/Levy 2009). Many of the interlocutors in my research perceive these checks as reinforcing that they do not fully belong in French society. Some identity checks lead to deaths, such as the case of Zyed Benna, a 17-year-old of Tunisian origin, and Bouna Traore, a 15-year-old of Malian origin, whose deaths in an electricity substation as they fled police in the *banlieue* of Clichy-sous-Bois, led to uprisings in *banlieues* throughout France. This police violence reinforces a second-class citizenship or status for these minority populations. Such a racial grammar and second-class status is an extension of the racial order between French police and colonized peoples in

Algeria or Senegal or Guadeloupe. It is an extension of the violence present in France's colonial empire.

Finally, I want to discuss the issue of transatlantic comparison related to Race and racism, which remains a debate in academia as scholars must simultaneously pay attention to local specificities and contexts while comparing societies. In the case of France, this is particularly fraught as mention of Race and racism easily invokes accusations of importing Anglo-American concepts and frameworks. As France is both anti-racial and non-racial, it is complicated for scholars, both within the French academy and outside of it, to analyze and discuss racism in France, tacit or otherwise. Critiques abound of the multiple differences between France and the United States in terms of their racial and colonial histories, among other phenomena. Yet these discussions are not new. From the Nardal sisters and other Negritude thinkers and their salons in Paris with African-American expatriate Harlem Renaissance figures, including Langston Hughes and Claude McKay, to the present global anti-racist mobilization against police violence, encompassing both the United States and France, what becomes clear is that this racial grammar is not just locally specific, but also global or transnational.

And this brings us back to James Baldwin. As a Black woman who has studied Race in France for over a decade, I am repeatedly asked or reminded of the history of African-American expatriates to Paris – those individuals like Josephine Baker or Chester Himes who seemingly fled a racist United States for a more racially inclusive and accepting French society. Yet as Baldwin reminds us, this narrative is much more complicated. Rather, as Baldwin writes of how his US passport proclaimed that he was not »to be treated as one of Europe's uncivilized, Black possessions«. It makes one wonder why we are still in a position to ask if racism exists or is institutionalized in interaction in France, when the answer is clearly a resounding yes.

Ethnomethodology, Tacit Racism, and Modernity

Giolo Fele

The contribution by Anne Rawls and Waverly Duck on tacit racism is an important essay for three reasons: two are theoretical, one methodological.

The first reason concerns a theoretical innovation in their approach, and regards the fundamentals of social action. The essay provides a fresh perspective on the fundamental basis of sociality and social belonging. In short, the authors' approach to the study of social life is based neither on individuals nor on large structures (such as political power, economic institutions, or social classes). The authors rely instead on what they call an analysis of *social interaction*. The theme of tacit racism is studied not from a social psychological perspective, such as when stereotypes are analysed, nor from a structural, institutional perspective, in which racism is the result of unjust laws, political power, or economic systems. Those are clear forms of racism. However, what interests the authors is the study of the sly and persistent forms of racism, even in situations where racism is denied. Even seemingly liberal and democratic people are imbued with those prejudices that govern relations between people of different cultural background. From this point of view, the novelty of the authors' approach seems to me evident, representing a break with approaches based on psychological-social or institutional explanations. The authors wish to examine the structure of expectations in interactions between Whites and Blacks. They are interested in what people actually do, aside from their intentions or opinions. The peculiar focus of their approach is on the plane of normality that constitutes social life: paraphrasing Wittgenstein (1958: 129), their focus is on the things that are »hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity«, which are »always before our eyes« and for that simple reason we are

»unable to notice« them. In this way, they are trying to lift the veil on reality before our very eyes. This is a genuine paradigm change in theoretical thinking. The authors are indicating where social life should be observed, not inside ourselves or far away in ›grand structures‹, but in its most open, obvious, everyday workings; they are inviting us to explore what happens around us regularly in the many exchanges we have with other people.

The second reason is methodological. In order to study social life closely, as it organizes itself before our eyes, the authors invite us to closely analyse social interaction in detail. The point that is highlighted by the authors is that we need to know what *really happens* in social interactions, without relying only on what we imagine might be happening. It is from this point of view, which may appear positivistic, but is, in fact, phenomenological and ethnomethodological, that the mechanisms of social interaction are revealed. This approach throws light on behaviour that is often unwanted and that lies outside consciousness and explicit awareness. The article divides the social interactions that make up daily social life into three categories: ›introductory sequences‹, ›fractured reflections‹, and ›submissive civility‹. For instance, the third, ›submissive civility‹ is based on a close examination of a video recording of an encounter between a Black individual and a policeman. The video recording allows us to precisely observe those delicate and volatile aspects of the interaction that cannot be noticed or remembered. The first, ›introductory sequences‹, is based on a small experiment (vom Lehn 2019) that consisted of a group of strangers introducing each other. The authors invited female students, who did not know each other, to introduce themselves. The second, ›fractured reflections‹,

consisted of subjects remembering details of their past personal experience. All three analytic strategies represent a working method for social research that I would call fundamental because they analyse the fundamentals of social life. As such, this method is particularly important and should be followed by all those who study social processes.

The third reason is again theoretical. In the article a theory of modernity clearly emerges that ultimately rests on an innovative reinterpretation of the work of Durkheim, especially on Durkheim's *De la Division du Travail Sociale* (Durkheim 1893), which Anne Rawls has been carrying out for many years. Modernity has brought a radical change in human cohabitation: We live in a world where the movement of people in social space, in accelerated time, produces completely new situations, even compared to the recent past. More occasions arise in which we meet more and more different people in public spaces. Faced with these characteristics of modernity, social theory seems to have fallen behind. Contemporary sociological theories seem to base the ordering of our collective lives on the sharing of norms and values. Through an original reinterpretation of Durkheim's notion of mechanical and organic solidarity, Rawls and Duck introduce the distinction between societies based on consensus and societies based on practice. Modern society is a practice-based society, whereas traditional societies are based on substantial consensus on the fundamental values of a society – the model is of course more nuanced, and the authors are right to hasten to add that »all societies have some consensus and some self-regulation. The difference is in the proportion«. This position has important consequences: Social competence in modern society requires the ability to interact with people who do not necessarily share the same horizon of values. The social order derives from local and settled competences in which people come to understand each other »through seeable, hearable sounds and motions that occur in time and space«. The theoretical approach and methodological orientation that we briefly examined above becomes an essential tool for any social theory that aims to tackle the challenges of modernity, not to mention the theme of tacit racism.

Some final considerations: As an example of militant social analysis, the essay is characterized by a committed political orientation. Throughout the essay there is a strong commitment towards certain ideals about the way we should be, what we would like society to become. Throughout the essay one perceives not only the academic analysis, but the commitment to change, which is considered important in order to overcome the current state of social relations – in this case Race-based. The fact that commitment to societal change and scientific analysis are not separate, but are closely intertwined, is commendable, but at the same time it runs the risk of positioning this perspective above and beyond the pledge of adherence to the facts of social life. For example, the omni-relevance of racial categories (»racism shapes literally everything«) makes us view every interaction from this perspective. This perspective thus becomes a theoretical framework, an assumption that hinders our taking into account other aspects. When institutional interactions are analysed, for instance, I do wonder if what is relevant on these occasions is not the categories of ›Black‹ and ›White‹ man but rather policeman and citizen. Moreover, it sometimes appears that the analysis and *description* of how social interactions are structured gives way to the *explanation* of that behaviour. For example, from analysing how unacquainted people exchange greetings or how the police question a suspect on particular occasions to explaining that these certain interactional routines are in place for a certain reason – in this case, because of Race, people behave this way *because* they are ›Black‹ or ›White‹ . I found this transition from the *how* to the *why* a difficult shift and not always grounded in the data at hand. This is perhaps an old

story in ethnomethodological conversation analysis – for example on the debate of the relevance of the category of gender in interaction (cf. Speer/Stokoe 2011). On the one hand, there is an exclusive concern oriented towards analysing the local structures of social interaction, but occasionally the overarching relevance of membership categories is missing; on the other hand, there is a strong commitment over the omni-relevance of some of these categories, and the fact that the analysis cannot be ›technical‹, neutral, and blind toward this matter of fact. Regarding this paper, my only fear is that to argue that everything is racial in social life can limit the ways in which

other social or institutional constraints impinge on the phenomena under examination. Taking sides on one issue can make us less attentive toward other possible phenomena that need to be analysed and taken into consideration.

However, the research program on which this article is based has been successful in offering important food for thought on the ways Race is realized in social interaction. It extends and challenges previous studies in the field and it should be considered as a source of inspiration for all researchers studying the production of social order.

Islamophobia after Passing »the Dinner Table Test« – or How the Racialization of Muslims Becomes Tacit

Martijn de Koning

According to Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, in 2011, in the UK, Islamophobia had already passed the »dinner table test« (Batty 2011). Certain expressions and manifestations of anti-Muslim racism had become socially acceptable and their utterance no longer disrupted conversational civility at the dinner table, such as »not to worry, he's only fairly Muslim«, »the family next door is Muslim, but they're not too bad«, and, with reference to women wearing a face veil, she is »either oppressed or is making a political statement« (ibid.). Sometimes Islamophobic expressions are dressed up to look like forms of Islamic criticism. Sometimes they serve as to turn a blind eye towards (or even of making a justification for) forms of aggression: Why do Muslims behave as if they are the victims when they themselves perpetrate terrorist attacks? In this form it appears as if it is not ›we‹ who are marginalizing ›them‹, but rather that ›we‹ are merely being critical, or simply want to find out who this other person is, for he/she belongs to a group that is causing so many problems. Islamophobia then becomes almost unrecognisable as such and can even sound reasonable and

realistic, as Van Baar explains in regard to another form of racism: antiziganism (Van Baar 2014).

All these forms of racism are integral parts of mainstream culture and occur regularly in everyday interactions; they may even form part of the structures of anticipated and accepted modes of interaction. However, such forms, and the processes through which they become unrecognisable, are difficult to detect and analyse. It is here that Anne Warfield Rawls and Waverly Duck's book *Tacit Racism* (2020), and their opening statement for this debate, became highly relevant and inspiring, concentrating as they do on explaining and analysing the everyday racism of interactions in the USA with the aim of showing how interaction orders are institutionalized. The book is particularly strong, in my view, when concrete interactions are analysed in detail.

In teasing out the connection between tacit racism in Europe and the US, it is worthwhile to have a look at anti-Muslim racism. In my work on anti-Muslim racism and racialization in the Netherlands, I have been inspired by various authors who have concep-

tualized Islamophobia as a form of racism (Sayyid/ Vakil 2010; Van der Valk 2015), by authors who have analysed how people respond to racism and oppression (hooks 1989), and how historical and contemporary perceptions of alleged ›Islamic threats‹ related to the representation of Islam as a sexist religion bent on oppressing women (Rashid 2016).

Terms such as anti-Muslim racism and Islamophobia are not easy to work with. The term Islamophobia in particular is contested inside academia and elsewhere (Halliday 1999). The arguments against the term Islamophobia and the interpretation of it as racist (including but not limited to hostility and discrimination) against Muslims and Islam are usually built upon the claim that Islam is a set of ideas to which people can freely subscribe (and, therefore, dissent from), making anti-Islam antagonism different from hostility and oppression based on racial and gender categories. In some cases, this argument is expanded to argue that, because Islam is different from race and gender, taking action against Islamophobia would amount to threatening free speech, which would feed into the discourses and practices of Islamists and could be a justification for individuals to commit intolerant (violent) acts in the name of Islam (Meer/Modood 2009). Yet, many authors point to the historical hierarchies, determinism, and essentialism that make up the discourses and identities that are ascribed to, and imposed upon, Muslims by a variety of actors, such as state institutions, politicians, and companies (Bravo López 2011). It is therefore crucial to understand the historical trajectories of race and racism in each country, as Anne Warfield Rawls and Waverly Duck rightfully point out. It is therefore puzzling that the authors also argue that »English colonies in North America developed a Black/White Race binary while Spanish and Portuguese colonies did not«, because of the fact that »[r]ace was invented to support the system of colonial labor in the American colonies when it confronted a sudden scarcity of unfree English/Irish labor«.

Although not exactly the same as the Black/ White binary mentioned by Anne Warfield Rawls and Waverly Duck, ideas about race did exist in the Spanish Empire, both in and outside of Europe – ideas which continued to develop in Europe even during and after the Spanish, Dutch, French and British colonisers built their empires, as, for example, Heng (2018) persuasively argues. Throughout the history of Europe, religion, culture, history, and territories were characterized and interpreted in a manner that served to differentiate between Europeanness and non-Europeanness (Sayyid 2018). The construction of racial categories mainly pertained to Jews, Muslims, and Black people as racial Others (Jansen/Meer 2020; Topolski 2018).

This, of course, does not mean that the approach set out by Anne Warfield Rawls and Waverly Duck is not relevant to Europe. I would argue that it is in fact relevant. As they demonstrate, each country has its own issues and trajectories of racism and racialization such that focusing on the intricacies of interaction could indeed make the implicit manifestations of race, racism, and racialization much more visible.

This kind of focus could also provide us with insight into how racism goes ›underground‹ or, in the case of Islamophobia, how Islamophobia becomes normalised in politics and policies. For example, through those discourses that are based upon on the almost self-evident necessity of integration and security and which are meant to safeguard ›our way of life‹, while, at the same time, defending secular freedoms as well as the Judaeo-Christian tradition (Van Den Hemel 2014; Vieten 2016; De Koning 2020). If Islamophobia is almost undetectable as a mode of racism, do other ways of thinking and/or opposing anti-Muslim racism then become deviant and abnormal?

In this regard, it is interesting that one of the most innovative contributions to anti-Islamophobia research, and one that reveals the process of Islamophobia normalisation in the Netherlands, was carried out by the Dutch anti-racism NGO *Meld Islamofobie*

(Report Islamophobia). Through exploratory research, they showed how political rhetoric in media and in parliament trickles down into people's lives in a myriad of ways (Meld Islamofobie 2019). Take, for example, those kinds of assumptions imposed upon Muslims and migrants that render them ›not really from here‹, or the examples mentioned at the beginning of the article. Importantly, people are often not entirely sure about how to interpret such an interaction, as I have also noticed in my own work. For example, in my work with Muslim militant activists (some of whom went to Syria to join IS or Al Qaeda from 2012 onwards) many recounted to me these kinds reoccurring experiences at school. One man told me:

»It was the day after 9/11. We talked about it in class and our teacher showed the video with George W. Bush saying: ›you are either with us or against us‹. Then the teacher stood up, pointed at me and asked ›And AA, where do you stand?‹. I didn't know. But I knew I wasn't with the Americans«.[19]

I have described elsewhere (De Koning 2019) how this remark reveals a sense of misrecognition and alienation. Yet, my conversations with him and many of his friends inside these militant circles, but also with other Muslims, for example in anti-racism organisations, show that people are often uncertain about how to understand a particular question or remark. Many recount such experiences but also pose questions to each other such as: »Are you sure you understood it well? Are you sure it was not just an innocent question?« It is important to not take for granted such ambiguities in people's experiences as they are manifestations of moral reasonings, of how they

try to make sense of the world and of other people, their perceptions of them and, perhaps, of attempts to translate them into action. It is in this moment of ambivalence where a lot of reflection (sometimes inattentively, sometimes deliberately) takes place as to what the exact meaning of the interaction might be, and how best to respond to it. It would be useful to explore these moral reasonings and moments of ambivalence at greater depth and to investigate the processes by which racism becomes tacit.

As I have shown in my work on the Dutch anti-Islamophobia initiatives, these initiatives create spaces for discussing Islamophobia and to raise awareness about everyday and institutionalized forms of Islamophobia (De Koning 2016). Although the research project undertaken by *Meld Islamofobie* was exploratory and based on an online questionnaire. Research of this sort may help to explain how particular events and rhetorical gestures in politics become part and parcel of the everyday ›interaction order‹. Work by colleagues in Spain in critical discussion groups (with different objectives) may also contribute to make such events visible (Lems 2020; Moustaoui Srhir 2020). This is similar to what Garfinkel (1940) has shown (also mentioned by Anne Warfield Rawls and Waverly Duck) with regard to the concealed social structures of Jim Crow and how they were exposed once two Black bus passengers refused to ›play the game‹, or, given the limits of such interference, to small acts of lesser disruption which can also highlight ongoing processes of normalisation. The kind of work done by *Meld Islamofobie* can be seen as ›breaching experiments‹ which cause disruption and perhaps interrupt the way in which the everyday order of things is taken for granted. In this way they become »diagnostic events« (Moore 1987) which reveal how tacit understandings are embedded in the moral orders. Following up on the work done by Anne Warfield Rawls and Waverly Duck would, therefore, also be a promising avenue for scholarly activism in Europe.

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19 My interlocutor probably mixed up different things here in his memory as Bush did say these words, but he did so on 20 September, 2001 and not 12 September, 2001. This is less relevant here as the focus of my work is on how people give meaning to particular events. See The White House/ President George W. Bush (2001).

Racialization in Action: The Ethnomethodological Perspective on Race and Racism

Christian Meyer

The initiative presented by Anne Rawls and Waverley Duck to study tacit everyday interactional practices that are implicitly or explicitly racist is timely and a welcome lead to advancing current debates about racism in the social and cultural sciences. Most current research focuses either on structural factors that produce racialized and, simultaneously, racializing inequalities, or on racist psychological attitudes. Instead, the authors study the realization of Race as a social object and racism in the unfolding dynamics of the here and now of interactional practices as they are directly empirically accessible.

The particular approach that the authors present takes »interaction order« as a starting point, claiming that systemic or structural racism is institutionalized »in the taken-for-granted practices of everyday interaction«, ultimately leading to the situation in which »ordinary people are constantly doing racist things without being aware of it«.

According to the authors, the most important moment whereby racism is institutionalized in the interaction order is the »interactional expectations« of the co-participants in social situations. These expectations, especially when they are shared, represent the »structures of racism«, and »acting on these structures produces racist outcomes – *in what people do* – regardless of individual intent or awareness« (emphasis in the original).

Expectations are constitutive of the social objects and meanings they produce. The authors compare them to »rules of a game«. Co-participants in interactional practices, as the authors put it, must necessarily orient themselves to the same expectations or rules and use the same definition of the situation. In doing so, they must presuppose that other participants are competent

and confirm their competent interactional work. All of this, however, »occurs at an unconscious level of taken-for-granted, and thus largely hidden, practices«. This is why the authors call their topic »tacit racism«.

Interactional expectations can be understood as a constitutive grammar of interaction. They belong to social situations »such that they are ›constitutive‹ of *the recognizability of an action as action* of a particular sort« [emphasis in the original]. This is true at least for those people who share those expectations (called »members« by Garfinkel 1967: vii).

Therefore, interactional expectations are fundamental to the procedural production of intersubjectivity, action coordination, and social order in general and Race is inextricably embedded in this: »When actions do not meet the constitutive expectations of others, those others cannot recognize what has been done, or said«. According to the authors, cultural and racial biases and culturally and racially biased social categories in the form of Black/White binarity are »coded into the interactional expectations«. Thus, social order and racial order are fundamentally intertwined and the abandonment of one would inescapably also disturb, or even demolish, the Other – the social contract, in other words, is a racial contract (Mills 1999).

The intention of the authors is thus to present an approach to Race (and racialization) that does not focus on stable mental concepts or psychic attitudes, or on comprehensive symbolic systems of a society, but rather on *how* social categories are created and used in situ, in the here and now of a particular situation through interactional practice. Inspired by conversation and embodied interaction analysis, their approach focuses on the »order properties« of

sequences of social action that people tacitly constitute and constantly adjust in making sense together. This is where the greatest benefit of their approach lies and where their empirical analyses produce important insights. They demonstrate that racialization is already interactionally accomplished when Americans first meet one another and start a conversation, or that class differences are equally racialized, as when high status Black Americans are not treated in accordance with their actual class positions.

The approach that the authors present captures important dimensions of racialized and racializing interactional practices. Further and complementary ethnomethodologically informed research should address in even more detail *how* co-participants select in the here and now of a social situation among a multitude of possible shared expectations those which are relevant for, and applicable in, the situation at hand in order not to transgress the fine line between creative and innovative (»artful«, Garfinkel 1967: vii) social action and the breaching of background expectancies that in social situations would lead to troubles of both cognitive understanding and normative evaluation. While co-participants in a social situation and members of a collectivity in general can orient themselves to, and thereby establish, shared rules in an infinite number of acceptable ways and, in doing so, »innovate endlessly«, they will typically be troubled by breaches in the constitutive rules, and »assign motive/blame to the individual who has done the unexpected thing«, as the Rawls and Duck say in reference to Garfinkel (1963). However, because breaches are typically attributed in interactions to the cooperative stance of the co-participants and not to the fragility of social order itself, the »immortality« (Garfinkel 1988) of social and, as entailed, racial order – as a fiction and continuing presupposition for further interactions – is guaranteed.

Therefore, an analysis of racism in action needs to investigate how the fiction and presupposition of the sharedness of those dimensions that constitute a racialized social order – such as expectancies, rules, codes, categories, the Black/White binarity – are established and continuously maintained, achieved, and accomplished in interactional practice. To take these dimensions for granted as (possibly shared) *a priori* elements fed into interactions would again imply a mentalization even if they are investigated as manifested in the course of interaction. I therefore propose to return to Garfinkel's *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967):

> »The activities whereby members produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with members' procedures for making those settings ›account-able‹. The ›reflexive‹, or ›incarnate‹ character of accounting practices and accounts makes up the crux of that recommendation. When I speak of accountable my interests are directed to such matters as the following. I mean observable-and-reportable, i.e. available to members as situated practices of looking-and-telling« (Garfinkel 1967: 1).

If we want to find out how racializing expectations, rules, codes, and categories are co-constituted and shared – procedurally and always preliminarily – in the here and now of social situations, we need to focus on how they are embedded and made available in situated practices of looking-and-telling. We need to investigate the pre-institutional, pre-codified, and pre-semiotic dimensions of Race and racialization inherent in these practices.

In the latter works mentioned above, Garfinkel (2002; 2007; Garfinkel/Livingston 2003) has developed a vocabulary to grasp the interconnectedness of looking and telling, of procedures which »produce and manage settings of organized everyday affairs« and which »make those settings ›account-able‹« (Garfinkel 1967: 1). He calls the organizational details of coherent social objects (such as Race) »phenomenal field properties« and conceptualizes them as being endogenously accomplished in practices that co-participants contribute to the scenery. These details

mutually point to and elaborate one another, thus establishing what Garfinkel (1967: 40; 2007: 43–47) calls the »essential indexicality« of social phenomena. In this way, a scenery familiar to members is created and practically interpreted beyond itself as a »document for« all kinds of further social phenomena. A scenery is familiar when situated practices of looking and telling fall into one.

In recent years, a number of studies were published which analyze racialized and racializing practices of looking-and-telling in social situations as well as the racialized and racializing reflexive and incarnate character of accounting practices from a phenomenological perspective, partly referring to Frantz Fanon's (1952) ground-breaking work in *Black Skin, White Masks* (Ahmed 2007; Alcoff 1999; Al-Saji 2014; Bloul 2013; Tullmann 2020; Yancy 2008). They help clarify the incremental and ever-changing phenomenal field properties of the social object Race and their effects on racializing social sceneries and situations. While they do not take video-recorded data of embodied interaction as evidence, they present autoethnographic accounts of racialized and racializing interaction.

In particular, these studies show that Du Bois' »double consciousness« can, in practice, also be viewed as ›double membership‹, in the ethnomethodological sense, of Black Americans in American society. This double membership burdens them with the double competence to participate in an incarnate and reflexive manner in both worlds, a burden that White Americans do not share, in spite of some self-descriptions: For one, they are able (and, for reasons of intelligibility and normative pressure, often forced) to participate competently in the racialized and racializing practices

of wider American collectivity, in which the Black body is »a battleground« that

»has been historically marked, disciplined, scripted and materially, psychologically and morally invested in to ensure both white supremacy and the illusory construction of the white subject as a self-contained substance whose existence does not depend upon the construction of the Black qua inferior« (Yancy 2008: 844).

Secondly, they competently participate in familiar practices of Black collectivities where their bodies are unproblematic, taken-for-granted, and in no need to become »hypervigilant« (ibid.: 857) as in encounters with White Americans, where they are forced to pay:

»almost neurotic attention to my body movements, making sure that this ›black object‹, what now feels like an appendage, a weight, is not too close, not too tall, not too threatening. ›Double layers of self-awareness must interrogate the likely meanings that will be attributed to every utterance, gesture, action one takes‹. So, I genuflect, but only slightly, a movement that somewhat resembles an act of worship. I am reminded of how certain postures – ›bowing and scraping‹ – were carried over generations through the movement, sometimes no doubt unconscious, of the Black body« (ibid.: 858).

Once again applauding Rawls and Duck for their endeavor to approach Race and racialization from an ethnomethodological and embodied interaction perspective, I suggest complementing their perspective with phenomenological inquiries into the »phenomenal field properties« of racialized embodiment and perception.

Are Turks Black and What Does it Matter?

Levent Tezcan

The following article examines to what extent, and in what ways, the concept of ›tacit racism‹ ,proposed by

authors Rawls and Duck, can be productively applied in Germany. It is a response to an invitation that was

issued by the authors with the following caveat: that the focus on »systemic racism embedded in social interactions« should take into account »that the conceptions of Race and the tacit structures of interaction involved will not be the same across countries (or even regions)« (Rawls/Duck 2020: 2). I intend to take this caveat into consideration in asking the question »Are Turks Black?« The answer is clearly: no, they are not Black and this has consequences for the researcher. The thesis, to which I subscribe, is as follows: certain problems should be considered in conjunction with the concept of ›systemic racism‹. Otherwise, one runs the risk of equating with racism the assorted frictions in interethnic relations, for which other modes of description may be better suited. As such, the focus should be on the issue of how »processes of figuration for societies of migration« (Hüttermann 2018) can be appropriately observed in their multiplicity.

The Lack of Slavery and Colonialism

Before exposing the specificity of interethnic relations in Germany, as compared with Black/White figurations in the USA, I shall give a brief summary of the authors' thesis. In its present version, the concept of ›tacit racism‹ is offered as an alternative to two other perspectives. It is distinguished, on the one hand, from ›microaggressions theory‹ (Sue 2010), which is equally concerned with the hidden structures of day-to-day racism, and which takes as its focus the individual and its structures of perception. It is also distinct from ›institutional racism‹ in so far as it focuses neither on legal documents nor formal structures. Hence, its unit for observation is constituted neither by the individual of the first theory nor the institution of the second. It is, rather, interactions that come to the fore. That racism is thereby embedded in material social-structures is particularly instructive: it was not until the White labour force was replaced by slaves that racism first took shape as a regulatory principle, with broad sections of the White population adapting

to/taking advantage of the new order. This order of racism, profoundly anchored in social structures, is of fundamental importance for any further analysis; without it, the hierarchies at work in the interactions between White and Black people, whether explicit or concealed, cannot be understood. Though these hierarchies can be observed throughout the USA, they do not always appear in the same guise. As such, the authors turn to the sociology of Durkheim for support: wherever social solidarity is based on consent (collective consciousness), such as in the Southern United States, racism has consistently appeared openly. In areas with a greater division of labour, on the other hand, racism is less visible. In terms of observing relations, it is under the conditions of the latter case that ›tacit racism‹ – for which the authors avail of ethnomethodological tools as proposed by Garfinkel – is particularly well suited.

The Turks, in this case, stand for a particular – and historically specific – type, namely the migrant who is not of European descent, but rather who migrates, ideally, from Europe's boarders, without thereby becoming ensnared in a colonial history of dependence. Regardless of whether or not they are the object of racially-motivated hostility, which they undoubtedly are, it is crucial to grasp that the relations of figuration, into which migrants of Turkish descent enter with local Germans, are not in the least characterised by the same history of slavery as there are in the US. This is due to the fact that they were neither enslaved nor colonised, plain and simple. There is no such history of subjugation and humiliation informing day-to-day encounters. History, if anything, offers the chance of mobilising the historical image of the Muslim ›Turkish danger‹ in order to stoke fears, not unsuccessfully, of the Turkish-Muslim migrant. Hence, what is means to have experienced slavery – or not, as is the case here – and its poisonous effects for the spirits of both parties is of critical importance. It was the fight against this phenomenon to which

Franz Fanon dedicated his life. In *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), Fanon rejects any attempt to explain the situation of former slaves with abstract theories – such as the contemporary concept of ›Othering‹ – that do not take specific *existences* into account. To other someone certainly involves hostility, but there is still an acknowledgement of the Other as an Other. This acknowledgement was denied slaves who, in the entirety of their being, were reduced to mere objects. This distinction, I might add, is rarely questioned by more recent forms of contemporary critical Race theory when it applies the lens of racism to interpret any halfway negative depiction of the ther by the majority. If my understanding of Fanon is accurate, neither racism nor slavery are odious because they engage in a politics of Othering, but rather because they deny the slave the very status of the Other. If we take Rawls' and Duck's main premise seriously, that is, that the history of slavery is foundational for the further efficacy of racism in interactions, then this foundation, as applied to (in this case, specifically: Turkish) migrants in Germany, is entirely absent. This is a warning to tread carefully with any comprehensive application of ›tacit racism‹. Of course, this does not mean that either the existence of racism or any of the diverse forms of discrimination are irrelevant. Rather, it expresses a scepticism for any potential attempts to account for interethnic relations primarily by way of this concept. By contrast, researching the meaning and effects of racism as a specific form of positioning in its diverse interactions makes a great deal of sense.

The situation of migrants can be observed from the beginning of the recruitment of guest workers. Guest workers were not engaged in forced labour. They were not forced, against their will, and under abhorrent conditions, onto ships. Instead, they took the road voluntarily and full of hope. They were not subject to the slave trader's desire to subsume them into a faceless mass, by classifying them as Black on the sole basis of their skin colour, and creating for them the single category ›African‹, for what was, in fact, a diversity of peoples. Even racial slurs such as ›Makkaroni-Fresser‹, ›Kümmel-Türken‹, ›Jugos‹ or ›Ithakas‹ afford some degree of esteem to those addressed, in so far as they register the specific belonging, which each group would ascribe to itself (that is, Italians, Turks, Yugoslavs, Greeks and so on). That they did not belong was not the consequence of racial subjugation, but rather a result of the fact that owing to their immigration or descent, they simply did not belong. They each brought with them their own sense of belonging, which they maintain to this day. Indeed, once the illusion of the guest worker had evaporated, that is, once the ideas of returning had subsided, the lack of a colonial experience for Turkish migrants would come to be of particular importance for the psychosocial effects of the relations of figuration. Once again, this does not mean that they were spared any experience of racism. They were undoubtedly the object of discrimination, both day-to-day and institutional, codified in the Foreigners Act. However, their historically-specific background may well have numbed them against such personal attacks somewhat. Ultimately, even the poorest ›Hanswurst‹, suffering the most serious identity crisis, can engage in an imaginative act of self-healing by asserting that »our ancestors once put the fear of God into the Europeans«. This could equally be said to differentiate their experiences from those of the descents of former slaves.

This point can be expanded to include one further aspect. Not only are the Turks not Black, they cannot even claim the status of people of colour. At this juncture, it is worth briefly examining this dubious term. Fundamentally, it brings together distinct ethnic groups under one category of supposed belonging, which otherwise does little to unite them, and may indeed do more to separate them. What do the Turks of today (and, to an extent, those of the past) have more in common with Arabs, Chinese, Indians and

Vietnamese – and what, indeed, do these groups all have more in common with one another – than they do with Germans (and vice versa)? What they have in common is undoubtedly that *they are not Germans*, and that, in Germany, is not insignificant. But does this justify raising this single distinction to the central category of a negative, concrete belonging? This is a category that was created as a critique of racism, the distinguishable characteristic of which is that it constitutes a counter position, that is, it can only be negatively affirmed. Black, as a category, first violently implemented by Whites, and subsequently adopted by African-Americans toward self-description, has its historical site within the White/Black figuration of slavery. The category ›people of colour‹, by contrast, is divorced of any such practical and experiential context. It generalises an historically-specific figuration by translating it into an abstract dichotomy in order to construct a felt sense of belonging. Some attempts have been made by some Turks to expand this notion to include Turkish people in Germany, who like other people of colour belong to the group of young educated migrants. But they're missing the experiential foundations.

The Germans have never been White for the Turks (nor, evidently, have they ever been so for the Kurds or other ethnic groups). Similarly, the Turks are neither White nor Black. The Black/White dichotomy is equally unsuited for the descriptions of self and Other in which Europeans are involved. Instead, it is the ›European/Westerner/Christian‹ that constitutes the other for the Turks, Kurds, Arabs and so on. Whoever wishes can throw together an ›illustrious‹ history of successfully defending against the ›crusaders‹. Indeed, levels of nationalism and fascism among migrants are far from trivial.

With regard to German-Turkish figuration, two particular features are now clearly discernible: both the lack of any history of colonialism or slavery on the one hand, and the fact that migration (temporary at first, then de facto long-term) was voluntary, on the other, fundamentally distinguish the existence of Turkish migrants in Germany from the Black population in the United States.

The thesis of »submissive civility«, which is ascribed by the authors to African-Americans, cannot be readily applied to migrants in Germany. It is certainly true of the German case that undemocratic, fundamentalist and nationalistic orientations can be widely observed among the migrant population (Tezcan 2002). And this regardless of the extent to which the dichotomy of ›White strong man‹, on the one side, and ›submissive man‹ (Black), on the other, is relevant for the foundation of American democracy. In any case, the Turkish referendum of 2017 saw a significant portion of Turkish migrants in Europe vote to extend the powers of a dictator. In relation to this, we might also ask whether this intimate transnational bond to the nation states of the countries of origin does not also constitute a further distinction to the situation of the Afro-Americans in the US.

Alternative Models?

Research projects on the dynamics of interethnic relations in Germany, which do not explicitly rely on analyses of racism, are already available in Germany, and they have produced important findings. The existence of racism is in no way denied thereby. But the dynamics of interaction are far too diverse as to be adequately captured through the lens of racism. Process-sociological analyses, primarily produced by Jörg Hüttermann (2018), provide us with an elaborate model in this regard, one which is based on several empirical studies.

This sophisticated model links the inter-group relations to the socio-economic circumstances, without reducing either aspect to the Other. As such, it is similar to the approach taken by Rawls and Duck. Different stages in the presence of migrants correspond to a particular, dominant pattern of figuration, which

consists of corresponding roles. For the ›foreign guest‹, confronted with the ›ushering host‹, relations are essentially governed by the right to hospitality. The later ›peripheral foreigner‹ establishes another relation of figuration, together with the ›usher‹. Though the former more frequently operates in communal life worlds, he does so in the absence of social ›lawyers‹ to act in his favour. The ›advanced foreigner‹, to which Hüttermann attaches a further figuration, no longer holds to the normative power of the right to hospitality, which had previously served as orientation for guest workers. Hüttermann adds further figurations involving ›culture subjects‹ and more individualised ›someones‹, the latter referring to a positionality around functional roles. We have here a dynamic model of interaction that links roles to both material contexts and social positioning. It is duly grounded while remaining sufficiently open. Above all, the model is particularly useful in examining interactions between the most significant minority groups and German locals as these are informed neither by a history of slavery nor one of colonialism.

The concept ›systemic/tacit racism‹ could certainly enrich the more ample model of sociological figuration, with a view to seeing figurations characterised by racism in greater detail. If it were the primary model, however, it would likely narrow our view of the diverse dynamics of relations of figuration described here. These simply cannot be adequately apprehended with the concept of racism.

Translation from German: Michael Dorrity.

Response to Contributors to the Debate

Anne Warfield Rawls and Waverly Duck

In our book *Tacit Racism*, and our article for this debate, we explain our approach to exposing systemic racism in social interaction through detailed studies of language and interaction and then address the question whether and how this new approach to Race and racism – based as it is on research in the US – could be a fruitful approach in Europe and elsewhere. Many countries in Europe claim not to have a problem with racism, talking instead about their difficulties with refugee and immigrant populations in terms of ›democracy‹, ›assimilation‹, ›inter-ethnic relations‹ and ›post-colonialism‹. However, such issues are often ›racialized‹ in ways that are obscured by approaches that focus more on »the assorted frictions in interethnic relations«, as Tezcan puts it, »for which other modes of description [than Race] may be better suited«. The danger is that categories of ›ethnicity‹, ›religion‹ and ›immigrant‹ may have been ›racialized‹ in ways that lead to an experience of exclusion best seen as racism. The problem we confront in discussing Race is that racism finds many ways of hiding in plain sight, and a focus away from racism toward categories not typically associated with Race is one of those ways.

While the particular processes and categories related to Race, racism and racialization in the US may be different from those elsewhere (or not), essential problems associated with what is being called ›ethnic‹ and ›inter-ethnic‹ relations and ›immigration‹, are very likely more properly viewed in racial terms, as a number of young scholars in the US and Europe argue (Garcia 2017; Husain 2017; Castañeda 2018; Beaman 2017). Making this adjustment requires rethinking how ›immigrant‹, ›Illegal‹, ›Turk‹, ›Muslim‹, etc., are social categories assigned on the basis of ›appearance‹ in ways that are determined by majority persons during interaction – just as Race is – and that such categories

can thus be ›racialized‹. As Garfinkel (2012[1947]) noted, in such cases the person being categorized has no say in the matter. The consequence is that fourth generation citizens are often categorized as immigrants, and Christians and Hindus as Muslim.

Overall the contributors have been receptive to our recommendation to look for tacit systemic racism in ›interaction order‹ expectations; pointing out that existing research has focused either on formal structures (like formal laws/policies), or on individual prejudice (often tied to beliefs and values), with the result that the domain of racism in interaction we focus on has been overlooked.

Focusing as we do on social interaction as process, our research is detailed. As Meyer notes, »the authors study the realization of ›Race‹ – as social object – and racism in the unfolding dynamics of the here and now of interactional practice as it is directly empirically accessible«. While others focus on individual and/or formal structures, we take the focus away from racists, laws, and roles/identities, because treating racism as inherent in persons, institutions and/or identities is both limiting and easily defeated by denials of intent to discriminate. We focus instead on forms of *racism* as interactional processes that do not require racist intent.

Our argument that systemic racism has become embedded in social interaction combines the idea that Interaction Orders organize everyday interaction (Goffman 1983; Rawls 1987), with the finding that social expectations can develop in response to oppression to produce what we call ›interaction orders of Race‹ (Rawls 2000). Focusing on interaction as process makes it possible to separate tacit systemic racism from other forms of discrimination and empirically document just how processes that support racism have become embedded in our most familiar daily actions.

The principal question raised in this debate is the extent to which an approach based on aspects of Race grounded in US history can be useful in the context of problems in Europe and elsewhere more commonly discussed in terms of ›immigration‹, ›ethnicity/religion‹ and/or ›colonialism‹. We suggest the answer is to be found in rethinking the categories that dominate the discussion in Europe in the context of a contrast between the positions of Franz Fanon (1952) and W.E.B. Du Bois (1904). While Fanon described negative effects of attempts to assimilate, to the extent that people are excluded from participation and blocked from assimilating on the basis of *surface appearances* that they cannot hide (and which may bear no relationship to their actual social status), they are likely to experience a consciousness of Race described by Du Bois as »double-consciousness«. Researchers in both the US and Europe are now reporting this kind of experience in conjunction with identities that have not historically been considered ›racial‹. Garcia (2017), for instance, argues that immigration has been racialized, which she calls »racializing illegality«, while Husain (2017) refers to »using religion as a starting point for understanding racialization today«. Castañeda (2018) describes the ›racializing‹ of various ›Hispanic‹ migrant populations. It is easy to forget that ›immigrant‹ and ›religion‹ are not visible – and that people use appearance, dress and speech as proxies for such categories in interaction in a way that can ›racialize‹ their use.

While some contributors doubt that Race and racism are prevalent in Europe, particularly in the context of what are being called »voluntary« immigrants and guest workers, current research suggests that processes of racialization are much more prevalent in Europe than Majority Europeans and many immigrants would like to believe – and that this racialization is being hidden by the current focus on ›religion‹, ›ethnicity‹ and the potential for ›assimilation‹ into a ›democratic‹ society. Beaman (2017) and Castañeda (2018) point out that processes of exclusion in France, can occur (and be felt) much the same way racism is

in the US, which Beaman suggests is likely to have complex tacit counterparts that are being overlooked. Both maintain that the tendency in France to insist that their society is not caught up in racism, makes it difficult to even talk about racism and how it works there – and the same is likely true for other countries in Europe. Beaman concludes that looking at tacit aspects of racism might be helpful in showing how racism is present in French society.

Before Trump most Americans also denied not only that they were racist, but that there was any significant racism in the country. This state of denial made it difficult to talk about Race or get research on racism taken seriously, while also marginalizing the work of minority scholars. Ethnicity was a more popular focus and research often focused on Irish, Italian and African ›immigrants‹ and their ›cultures‹ as if the processes involved were equivalent. The overt racism of the Trump years (including racial disparities exposed by COVID-19), in conjunction with police executions of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor (and many other Black Americans), BLM protests, and the current struggle over voting rights have made racism more obvious. Nevertheless, many still deny it. Discussions of tacit racism have been a powerful tool in overcoming denial of racism in the US and could do the same in Europe.

Like de Koning and Tezcan we think the common practice of referring to Race as a process of Othering, in other words, as just one among many processes of Othering (and intersectionality), may be part of the problem – and that our approach might be useful in addressing this tendency. Certainly, Othering is going on, and intersectionality is an important contributing factor. But, racism and racialization rise to another level of exclusion in ways that require taking tacit racism into account on its own terms. The problem is not merely that people are constructed as ›Other‹, but is rather, a deeper failure to recognize them as human members of society, which leads in turn to

creative survival responses that change the dynamics of interaction order expectations.

In assessing the relevance of our research in the German context, Tezcan emphasizes the essential role of slavery in the formation of the US Black/White binary and asks, »are Turks Black?« While it is true that the categories Black/White developed in the context of US slavery, Europe also participated in the slave trade and the rush to colonize the countries it destabilized. Still, none of that answers the question whether »Turks are Black«, or whether they experience racism in Germany. The experience of ›Blackness‹ and racialization are not limited to those who are categorized or self-identify as Black. Rather, the question involves social definitions and experiences of exclusion and interaction order differences that are constantly evolving. In asserting that »The answer is clearly: no, they are not Black and this has consequences for the researcher«, Tezcan assumes the question has a definite answer, going on to suggest that the problem in Germany is more complicated than Race and racism, and expressing concern that our focus on tacit racism, while important, would be problematic if it became the main approach.

We take the position that NOT recognizing the importance of Race/racialization as social process is the problem. Race is not something ›real‹ that people actually have or do not have. Race is socially defined, and actualized through tacit practices in social interaction – which the recipient of the category has no control over. What matters is whether a category excludes in ways that produce the experience of exclusion that accompanies Race and/or whether persons in the category still look forward to being assimilated.

That exclusion occurs in Germany to persons of Middle-Eastern background in terms best described as racial is indicated by a March 30, 2021 (dw.com) report on the racism experienced by a Syrian candidate for parliament in Germany: »On Tuesday, Tareq Alaows, a 31-year-old Damascus-born Syrian

refugee and human rights activist, announced that racist attacks and personal threats had forced him to withdraw what had been billed as a historic political candidacy for Germany's parliament, the Bundestag«. Alaows described his own experience in racialized terms, saying that he was »exposed to ›massive racism‹ during [his] short candidacy«.

In keeping with current research on how social categories can be racialized, we argue that it is likely that the social categories ›Turk‹, ›Middle-Eastern‹, ›immigrant‹, ›Muslim‹, etc., are all currently being racialized in Germany, as Beaman and Castañeda argue they have been in France. To the extent such categories are assigned on the basis of ›appearance‹ or ›language‹, in ways that *block attempts to assimilate*, as in Alaows' case, they likely produce the experience of »Race consciousness«.

Our point in explaining the origin of Black/White Race categories in US slavery was that they are social constructions that racialized identities that were not previously considered in racial terms. Categories related to immigration in Europe are being racialized much the same way »illegal« has been racialized in the US (Garcia 2017). Racialization is a fluid process. As a Turkish researcher recently told us, she has developed a consciousness of Race she never had before coming to the US (Ringen Firat). The same thing has happened recently for Asian Americans, many of whom have remarked on a new »Race consciousness« that conflicts with their prior (typically frustrating) efforts to assimilate. These experiences of Race consciousness are not determined by whether people are identified as Black, but rather, by the degree of exclusion they are subjected to and how they experience it.

The question then is not, as Tezcan puts it, whether certain people ›are‹ Black or White in Germany, or live in a country with a history of slavery. The question is whether the categories they are subjected to, and the exclusion enacted through those categories is experienced such that they develop a »Race consciousness« – in which case these categories and people have been ›racialized‹ – *and that is an empirical question* that involves what happens in social interaction.

It is our position that widespread development of such Race consciousness is ultimately a good thing. Bonilla-Silva (2003), in writing about color-blind racism, argued that the possibility of assimilating (or believing in the possibility), combined with a denial of being either Black or People of Color had led lighter skinned Latino/a people to side with White Americans against Black Americans. If it is the possession of Race consciousness that leads to awareness of inequality and the embrace of more democratic ideals – as Du Bois maintains – then the more people who develop such a consciousness the stronger the democratic heart of a people will be. Currently in the US, it is all but impossible for those not unequivocally ›seen‹ as White to avoid such an awareness. This likely explains the recent political shift of many Latino/a and Asian Americans in a more inclusive direction. It is also the principle behind our advocating the development of what we call a »White double-consciousness«. Ironically, pressure to assimilate works against this development and its corollary: an increased appreciation for democracy.

In this regard, fine points of difference between Fanon and Du Bois on the issue of oppression and assimilation matter. Fanon's concern is with conflicts for those who experience exclusion but are still trying to assimilate, which could be more likely under European conditions, whereas in the US the impossibility of assimilating is likely to lead to development of Race consciousness and the more democratic standards and expectations that come with it. This, Du Bois argued, is what enabled Black Americans to use Race to transcend Race – while in social contexts where assimilation is possible (or seems possible), pressure to assimilate tends to force people to continue trying to meet conditions that can lead to self-hatred and low self-esteem.

Assimilation is now a negative force that asks people to give up who they are, which includes both

cultural practices and identities. It presumes that the majority society is best and has nothing to learn from incoming minorities. If we believe a modern society is strengthened by diversity, then we *should be able to see* that assimilation works against that diversity. What we should want, according to Castañeda (2018: 2f.) is ›integration‹ without loss of culture – a multi-cultural ideal. Progress requires constant change that maintaining cultural homogeneity works against. To what extent Europe will tend toward Fanon's end of the scale and away from Du Bois' will depend in part on the degree to which members of excluded groups believe assimilation is possible, or begin to develop a Race consciousness. This may be rapidly changing at present as Alaows' case indicates.

Beaman relates tacit racism to what she calls a »racial grammar«, in the Wittgensteinian sense. Referring to the roots of a racial grammar in France, she relates that development to colonialism, arguing that »France's colonization of the Maghreb, West Africa, Vietnam, and parts of South America and the Caribbean (including Guadeloupe and Martinique which are presently overseas *départements* of France), was part of its civilizing mission to spread its ›values‹ around the world,« and that »While French Republican ideology does not recognize identity-based categories, including race and religion (Chapman/Frader 2004), France's colonial empire relied on a differential construction of populations seen as ethnically different (Kastoryano/Escafré-Dublet 2012)«. In other words, such »racial grammars« enable racial and ethnic distinctions to become essential in ordinary interaction even »in the absence of official state categories«. The tacit character of such racialization – and the development of related racialized grammars that avoid mentioning Race – such as those involving ›illegals‹, ›Turks‹ and ›Muslims‹ – all work to hide racism from view.

Citing James Baldwin's experience in Paris, Beaman notes that, as in our book we »use ›submissive civility‹ to explain the expected behavior of Black men in the face of White police officers in the US,

this ›submissive civility‹ is also applicable in the French context, as police officers perform identity checks, or *les contrôles d'identités,* disproportionately targeting Black and Maghrébin-origin individuals (Fassin 2013; Jobard/Levy 2009)«. Beaman notes that an American accent can modify treatment of Black and Muslim people, suggesting that the racialization of these categories is very complex. »What becomes clear« Beaman says, »is that this racial grammar is not just locally specific, but also global or transnational«, which would suggest its significance throughout Europe. The tacit character of this racialization, »[t]his erasure of the colonial« and the work that goes into hiding it behind other factors, Beaman argues: »leads to a ›panic‹ of the postcolonial«.

De Koning notes that, »the kind of assumptions imposed upon Muslims and migrants which render them ›not really from here‹« also render particular interactions »›diagnostic events‹ (Moore 1987), which reveal how tacit understandings are embedded in the moral orders«. Such diagnostic events, we argue, are essential to the work of revealing tacit racism – and we rely heavily on them. After describing a classroom scene after 9/11 in which the teacher pointed at a Muslim student and asked »are you with us or against us?«, de Koning says, »[i]t is important to not take for granted such ambiguities in the experiences of people as they are manifestations of moral reasonings that pertain to how people try to make sense of the world, trying to make sense of other people and their perceptions of them and, perhaps, translate them into action«.

These moments of moral reasoning are often analysed without mentioning Race, even though such ›events‹ are often based on appearance, and thus require a context of racialization to make sense of in the first place. Thinking of racism as both tacit and systemic, and focusing on what Beaman calls a »grammar« of racism and de Koning calls »moral reasonings«, should help make better sense of such questions. Ethnomethodology explores the way people

make sense together – their moral reasoning as it is exposed by interactional trouble – which is one way, as de Koning concludes, that showing how »racism becomes tacit would be useful« and »a promising avenue for scholarly activism in Europe«.

In doing this research, it is essential, as Meyer and Fele underscore, to do detailed empirical observation of how actual interactions take place, which makes ethnomethodology and conversation analysis fruitful additions to ethnographic and interview approaches to racism and racialization.

Additionally, as Fele notes, there is a new theory of modernity involved in our approach that builds on novel interpretations of Durkheim and Du Bois to emphasize the importance of tacit practices that are constitutive of racism, and argue that reciprocity and equality are needed to support these practices in diverse modern social spaces where stranger/stranger interactions predominate (Rawls 2019). This theory posits that diversity is not only a strength of modernity – diversity is necessary for progress in science and occupations – and that it cannot succeed without equality and reciprocity. The consequence is that assimilation is anti-modern; while integration and multiculturalism are modern.

Lastly, we respond to Fele's concern »that to argue that everything is racial in social life can limit the ways in which other social or institutional constraints impinge on the phenomena under examination«. This is an important concern that is likely to be repeated by others. Therefore, it is important to point out that we are *not arguing that everything is racial*, or that people are aware of these effects of Race; but rather, that without the White majority being aware of it *Race has gotten into everything and many social categories have been racialized*. This is something the excluded are often aware of – while the White majority remain unaware.

In a world in which Race categories have been allowed to organize political, economic, and social spaces for hundreds of years – the effects of Race will turn up all over the place – in aspects of social life that are in no way about Race. Trying to confine studies of Race to parts of social life that are *about* Race has the unfortunate effect of turning attention away from Race and scholars of Race, when what we need is to focus on them more. The result has been that Black and marginalized scholars, like Du Bois and Eric Williams (1943), who long ago pointed out the wide-ranging effects of slavery and the resulting racial binary, have been treated as ›merely‹ scholars of Race, while the study of Race and racism has been confined to marginal spaces and treated as if it concerned only racial minorities. *This has been a huge mistake*.

Fele is of course right that the shift from ›how‹ to ›why‹ is »a difficult shift, not always entirely grounded in the materials at hand«. It is a theoretical shift, but one in which we keep as close as possible to the intersection between the writings of racialized scholars like Du Bois and our own empirical research. Not to make this shift, however, would be to remain within the mainstream White dominated form of reasoning that enables racism to remain hidden.

We maintain that the »moral authority« of Whiteness controls public expectations – including the reasoning of mainstream researchers – to such an extent that categories of people who have been racialized not only have trouble getting their voices heard, but often have difficulty being recognized as human. There are no social roles that neutralize Race: even powerful roles such as ›President of the US‹, ›Police Officer‹, or ›Company Vice President‹. This problem permeates every aspect of daily life in the US and we suspect elsewhere. Therefore, centering Race and its attendant issues – and refusing to subordinate them to other concerns – is a critical issue for theory and research. We do not think the danger is that focusing on tacit racism will obscure the complex nuances of inter-ethnic relations. In fact, we believe the reverse is the case and that talking about these issues without mentioning Race is obscuring racism. Recognition of

the centrality of Race to social, economic and political issues worldwide is long overdue, and we maintain that the possibility of true democratic social action awaits this recognition.

In Europe as in the US, tacit racism will likely be difficult to expose, because it is well hidden and it's non-existence is taken-for-granted. It will also be difficult for the Majority to accept because acceptance means giving up cherished beliefs about the fairness and democratic character of a given society and the positive value of assimilation into it. Tacit racism can be found by close examination of social interaction, because that is where racism is enacted in daily life. Failure to document how this works will leave societies believing they do not have a Race problem, when they do, and thus unable to deal with it – or even to talk about it.

When researchers do find racism embedded in interaction they can work *backward* from what they find to how it might have emerged, bringing that history and the marginalized scholars who have likely already written about it to the forefront. The process can also work *forward* to implications for improving the current situation. This would be an important addition to our understanding of Race and racism in Europe that will not come from conventional studies of ›ethnicity‹, ›inter-ethnic relations‹, ›religion‹, ›immigration‹, etc.

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